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Defendants-Appellants
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And
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Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence)
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Husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants.
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CLEW'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Kootenai.

HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL
District Judge
Attorney for Appellants
John P. Whelan
Attorney at Law
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Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal.

Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence
Date

Code

User

6/27/2003

NEWC

LEITZKE

New Case Filed

LEITZKE

Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No John T. Mitchell
Prior Appearance Paid by: Owens, James,
Vernon & Weeks Receipt number: 0570774
Dated: 06/27/2003 Amount: $77.00 (Check)

SUM1

GLASS

Summons Issued

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

HILDRETH

Ex Parte Motion For Temporary Restraining
Order

John T. Mitchell

HILDRETH

Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion
For Temporary Restraining Order

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

JANUSCH

Temporary Restraining Order

John T. Mitchell

BNDC

PARKER

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 574049 Dated
07/25/2003 for 3000.00)

John T. Mitchell

AFSV

NORIEGA

Affidavit Of ServiceIBrenda J. Lawrence /July 28, John T. Mitchell
2003

AFSV

NORIEGA

Affidavit Of Service/Found/Dougias
LawrenceIJuly 28, 2003

SATERFIEL

Filing: 17A - Civil Answer Or Appear. All Other
John T. Mitchell
Actions No Prior Appearance Paid by: Ian Smith
Receipt number: 0575516 Dated: 08/06/2003
Amount: $47.00 (Check)

NOAP

SATERFIEL

Notice Of Appearance ONLY

John T. Mitchell

SUBC

LE ITZKE

Notice of Substitution Of Counsel (Samuel
Eismann sub in for Ian Smith for Defendants)

John T. Mitchell

NOTC

PARKER

Notice of Substitution of Counsel

John T. Mitchell

NOTD

NORIEGA

Notice Of Deposition of Harold Funk

John T. Mitchell

NOAP

LE ITZKE

John T. Mitchell

NOAP

DRAPER

John T. Mitchell

NOPD

MEYER

Notice Of Appearance (Douglas Lawrence, Pro
Se)
Notice Of Appearance ( Brenda Lawrence, Pro
Se)
Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued

AFRT

MOLLETT

Affidavit Of Retention

John T. Mitchell

IOPR

DUBE

Inactivity Order Printed - File Sent to Judge

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

MOLLETT

ORDER OF RETENTION

John T. Mitchell

STAT

THORNE

Case status changed: reopened

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

THORNE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 09/14/2004 04:OO PM)

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

GLASS

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

GLASS

Affidavit of Harold Funk

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

GLASS

Affidavit of Susan Weeks

John T. Mitchell

MEMO

GLASS

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

MNSJ

GLASS

Motion For Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

NOAP

JOKELA

Notice Of Appearance for Defendant

John T. Mitchell

712212003

7/25/2003

712912003

Judge
John T. Mitchell

John T. Mitchell

John T. Mitchell
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Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal.

Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence
Date

5/9/2005

Judge

Code

User

MOTN

JOKELA

Motion for Enlargement

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

JOKELA

Affidavit of John P Whelan

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

NORIEGA

Affidavit of Daniel E Rebeor in Support of Motion John T. Mitchell
for Temporary Restraining Order

CONT

THORNE

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell
held on 09/14/2004 04:OO PM: Continued

HRSC

THORNE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 11/09/2004 04:OO PM)

John T. Mitchell

NTSV

HILDRETH

Notice Of Service

John T. Mitchell

ANSW

VICTORIN

Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial John T. Mitchell

ANHR

SATERFIEL

CERT

SATERFIEL

Amended Notice Of Hearing -- 11-9-04 @ 4:00
Pm
Certificate Of Service

John T. Mitchell

NTSV

SWIGART

Notice Of Service

John T. Mitchell

FlLE

RICKARD

FILE #2 Created

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

SWIGART

Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

NTSV

SWIGART

Amended Notice Of Service

John T. Mitchell

ANSW

RICKARD

Answer To Counterclaim

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

RICKARD

Request For Judicial Notice

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

SWIGART

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Tower Asseet Sub, INC.

John T. Mitchell

MEMO

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

ROBINSON

Affidavit of John P. Whelan Regarding failure to
secure and affd from Human Synergistics

John T. Mitchell

RQHR

ROBINSON

Request For Judicial Notice Hearing Date
11-09-04

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

PARKER

Request for Judicial Notice

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

PARKER

Motion to Strike

John T. Mitchell

HRHD

THORNE

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell
held on 11/09/2004 04:OO PM: Hearing Held

FJDE

JOKELA

Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered

CVDl

JANUSCH

FJDE

JANUSCH

Civil Disposition entered for: Lawrence, Brenda J, John T. Mitchell
Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant;
Tower Asset Sub Inc, Plaintiff.
order date: 11/9/2004
John T. Mitchell
Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered

NOTE

ROHRBACH

File sent to Judge to have counsel prepare an
Order

John T. Mitchell

John T. Mitchell

-
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Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal.

Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence
Date

Judse

Code

User

ORDR

JANUSCH

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment & John T. Mitchell
Entering Decree of Quiet Title

VlCTORlN

John T. Mitchell
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court
Paid by: John Whelan Receipt number: 0658480
Dated: 07/07/2005 Amount: $9.00 (Check)

BNDC

VICTORIN

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 658482 Dated
07/07/2005 for 100.00)

John T. Mitchell

APSC

VlCTORlN

Appealed To The Supreme Court

John T. Mitchell

STAT

JANUSCH

Case status changed: closed pending clerk
action

John T. Mitchell

NLTR

LE ITZKE

Notice of Lodging Transcript

John T. Mitchell

BNDV

LEITZKE

Bond Converted (Transaction number 9489500
dated 09/08/2005 amount 100.00)

John T. Mitchell

RECT

LEITZKE

Receipt Of Transcript (Susan Weeks)

John T. Mitchell

LE ITZKE

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of
Transcripts For Appeal Per Page Paid by: John
Whelan Receipt number: 0667858 Dated:
09/20/2005 Amount: $1 53.75 (Check)

John T. Mitchell

LE ITZKE

Miscellaneous Payment: Appeal Transcript Cover John T. Mitchell
Paid by: John Whelan Receipt number: 0667858
Dated: 09/20/2005 Amount: $18.55 (Check)

MlSC

JREYNOLDS

Receipt for Records

John T. Mitchell

BNDE

VlCTORlN

Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 3,000.00)

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

PARKER

Supreme Court Opinion

John T. Mitchell

REMT

ROBINSON

Remittitur

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference
05/14/2007 03:OO PM) Set WlCV02-7671

John T. Mitchell

STAT

CLAUSEN

Case status changed: Reopened

John T. Mitchell

CLAUSEN

Notice of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 06/13/2007 03:OO PM) set
WlCV02-7671 - Weeks

John T. Mitchell

MNSJ

VlCTORlN

Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

VlCTORlN

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

MEMO

REMPFER

Memorandum in support of revewed motion for
summary judgment

John T. Mitchell

HRHD

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on
05/14/2007 03:OO PM: Hearing Held Set
WlCVO2-7671

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled
1211012007 09:OO AM) Ist Priority - 4 Days

John T. Mitchell

CLAUSEN

Notice of Trial

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

HULL

Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Enlargement

John T. Mitchell

-
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Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell
Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal.

Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence
Date

Code

User

513 112007

AFFD

HULL

Affidavit of John P. Whelan

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

HULL

Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

HULL

Motion for Enlargement

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

LEPIRE

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0611312007 03:OO
PM) Enlargement of time; shorten time;
disqualification for cause - Whelan

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

VlCTORlN

Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Douglas
Lawrence Filed 5-30-07 & Notice of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

MEMO

VlCTORlN

Reply Memorandum un Support of Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

VlCTORlN

Affidavit of john Whelan

John T. Mitchell

APPL

VICTORIN

Application for Order Shortening Time

John T. Mitchell

MNDQ

VlCTORlN

Motion To Disqualify for Cause

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

HULL

Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of John
Mack Filed 5130107

John T. Mitchell

NOTH

MCCORD

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

NOTH

MCCORD

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0611312007 03:OO
PM) Set WlCV02-7671 - Weeks - Strike Affd
John Mack & Portion Affd Doug Lawrence

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order Shortening Time

John T. Mitchell

HRHD

CLAUSEN

HRHD

CLAUSEN

HRHD

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell
held on 06/13/2007 03:OO PM: Hearing Held set
WlCV02-7671 - Weeks
John T. Mitchell
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/13/2007
03:OO PM: Hearing Held Set WlCV02-7671 Weeks - Strike Affd John Mack & Portion Affd
Doug Lawrence
John T. Mitchell
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/13/2007
03:OO PM: Hearing Held Enlargement of time;
shorten time; disqualification for cause - Whelan

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
Motion for Disqualification for Cause

John T. Mitchell

FILE

NAYLOR

New File Created 3 of 3

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 08/07/2007 04:OO PM) Weeks - set
wICR02-7671

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

CLAUSEN

Motion for Reconsideration

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

CLAUSEN

Motion for Permission to Appeal from an
Interlocutory Order

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

CLAUSEN

Affidavit of John P. Whelan

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider
08/06/2007 01 :30 PM) Whelan - CV02-7671

John T. Mitchell

6/5/2007

Judge

-

Date: 7/16/2008
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Tower Asset Sub Inc vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence
Date

Judge

Code

User

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/06/2007 01:30
PM) Permission to Appeal - Whelan

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

MCCOY

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

MCCOY

AMENDED Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

MCCOY

Supplemental Affidavit of John P. Whelan

John T. Mitchell

MEMS

MCCOY

Memorandum In Support Of Motion for
Reconsideration

John T. Mitchell

CLAUSEN

Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P.
Whelan

John T. Mitchell

AFlS

MCCOY

Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of
Opposition to Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

MCCOY

Motion for Enlargement

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

MCCOY

Motion to Strike

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

MCCOY

Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

MCCOY

Request for Judicial Notice

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

MCCOY

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/07/2007 04:OO
PM) Enlargement of Time; Strike; Request for
Judicial Notice - Whelan

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

MCCORD

plaintiff's opposition to motion to reconsider

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

HUFFMAN

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike or in the Alternative for John T. Mitchell
Enlargement of time to File Responses

FILE

JANUSCH

New File Created ****4**********

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/07/2007 04:OO
PM) Strike All Whelan's Motions - Weeks

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

PARKER

Motion to Shorten Time

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

PARKER

Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Douglas
Lawrence Filed July 24, 2007

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

PARKER

Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

NOTH

PARKER

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

DENY

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on John T. Mitchell
08/06/2007 01 :30 PM: Motion Denied Whelan CVO2-7671

DENY

CLAUSEN

John T. Mitchell
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/06/2007
01 :30 PM: Motion Denied Permission to Appeal
- Whelan

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider John T. Mitchell
and Motion for Permissive Appeal

CONT

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell
held on 08/07/2007 04:OO PM: Continued
Weeks - set wICR02-7671

Date: 711612008
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Time: 07147 AM
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Date

Code

User

HELD

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion held on 08/07/2007
04:OO PM: Motion Held Enlargement of Time;
Strike; Request for Judicial Notice - Whelan

John T. Mitchell

HELD

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion held on 08/07/2007
04:OO PM: Motion Held Strike All Whelan's
Motions - Weeks

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 09/24/2007 03:OO PM) - Weeks- 1
Hour

John T. Mitchell

CLAUSEN

Judge

Notice of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

MCCORD

plaintiff's Motion for protective order re. defs
notice of deposition

John T. Mitchell

OBJT

MCCORD

Objection to notice of depositition & demand for
production of documents

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

HUFFMAN

Amended Notice of Deposition and Demand for
Production of Documents

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

MCCOY

Subpoena Duces Tecum

John T. Mitchell

NOTC

MCCOY

Notice of Deposition and Demand for Production John T. Mitchell
of Documents

MOTN

MCCORD

plaintiff's Motion for protective order re. defs 2nd John T. Mitchell
notice of deposition

NOTD

LSMITH

Notice Of Deposition, John Rook

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

VlCTORlN

Motion for Enlargement

John T. Mitchell

MNCL

VlCTORlN

Motion To Compel

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

VlCTORlN

Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of
Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

VlCTORlN

Supplemental Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in
Support of Opposition to Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

VlCTORlN

Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

VlCTORlN

Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of
John T. Mitchell
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer

AFFD

VlCTORlN

Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell
Enlargement and Motion to Compel

NOHG

VlCTORlN

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order Denying Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order Granting Defendants' Motion for
Enlargement

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order Granting Defendants' Request for Judicial
Notice of the Court Files

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Strike

John T. Mitchell

Date: 711612008

-
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Date

Code

User

NOTR

GBROWN

Notice Of Transcript Delivery of Harold Funk

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

PARKER

Motion to Correct Judgment

John T. Mitchell

STIP

PARKER

Stipulation to Plaintiff's Motion for Enlargement

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

PARKER

Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Doug
Lawrence Filed September 10,2007

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants' John T. Mitchell
Pleadings or in the Alternative for Enlargement of
Time

ORDR

CLAUSEN

MOTN

CLAUSEN

Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Portions of
John T. Mitchell
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence Filed July 24, 2007
Amended Motion to Correct Judgment
John T. Mitchell

MOTN

CLAUSEN

Motion to Shorten Time

John T. Mitchell

NOTH

CLAUSEN

Notice Hearing

John T. Mitchell

CONT

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell
held on 09/24/2007 03:OO PM: Continued 1
Hour

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 11/28/2007 03:OO PM) Weeks

CLAUSEN

Judge

Notice of Hearing

John T. Mitchell
John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order on Motion for Enlargement

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order on Motion to Compel

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Order on Motion for Leave to Amend Answer

John T. Mitchell

NOTC

GBROWN

Second Amended Notice of Dposition and
Demand for Production of Documents

John T. Mitchell

NTSD

GBROWN

Notice Of Service Of Discovery

John T. Mitchell

NTSV

HUFFMAN

Notice Of Service

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/27/2007 03:30
John T. Mitchell
PM) Renewed Motion for DQ - Whelan - 112 hour

MNDQ

VlCTORlN

Renewed Motion To Disqualify for Cause

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

VlCTORlN

Affidavit of john Whelan in Support of motion for
Disqualification

John T. Mitchell

NOTC

CLAUSEN

Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript from
Hearing Dated 8/7/07

John T. Mitchell

NOTC

CLAUSEN

Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript from
Hearing Dated 6113/07

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

LSMITH

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

VlCTORlN

Additional Objections to Affidavit of Robert Hall

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

VlCTORlN

Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From John T. Mitchell
an Interlocutory Order

NOHG

VlCTORlN

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue
11/27/2007 03:30 PM) Mtn Court Trial - Weeks

John T. Mitchell

Date: 711612008
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Date

Code

User

Judge

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/27/2007 03:30
PM) Substitute Real Property Interest - Weeks

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

VlCTORlN

Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Renewed motion for Summary
Judgment

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

VlCTORlN

Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

VlCTORlN

Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to
Renewd Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

VlCTORlN

Affidavit of Raymond Goodwin in Support of
Substitution of Real Party in lnterest

John T. Mitchell

MNCN

VlCTORlN

Motion To Continue Trial

John T. Mitchell

NOTC

VlCTORlN

Notice of Change of Address

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

VlCTORlN

Motion for Substitution of Real Party in lnterest

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

VlCTORlN

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

VlCTORlN

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

NTSV

HUFFMAN

Notice Of Service Susan P Weeks by Fax
11112/07

John T. Mitchell

NTSV

GBROWN

Notice Of Service forTower Asset Sub Inc on
11-13-07

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

John T. Mitchell
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/27/2007 03:30
PM) Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal Whelan

MlSC

MCCOY

Response to Second Motion to Disqualify

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

HUFFMAN

Plaintiffs Supplemental Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

HUFFMAN

Exhibit List

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

HUFFMAN

Witness List

John T. Mitchell

DENY

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007
03:30 PM: Motion Denied Renewed Motion for
DQ - Whelan - 112 hour

John T. Mitchell

HELD

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on
11/27/2007 03:30 PM: Motion Held Mtn Court
Trial - Weeks

John T. Mitchell

GRNT

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007
03:30 PM: Motion Granted Substitute Real
Property Interest - Weeks

John T. Mitchell

CONT

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on
John T. Mitchell
1211012007 09:OO AM: Continued 1st Priority - 4
Days

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and
Initial Pretrial Order

John T. Mitchell

-
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Date

Code

User

Judge

HELD

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell
held on 11/28/2007 03:OO PM: Motion Held
Weeks

GRNT

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007
John T. Mitchell
03:30 PM: Motion Granted Renewed Motion for
Permission to Appeal - Whelan

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/12/2008 09:OO John T. Mitchell
AM) 5 Days - 1st Priorty

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
Defendants' Renewed Motion for Permission to
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order

John T. Mitchell

MlSC

SHEDLOCK

John T. Mitchell

FILE

JANUSCH

Expert Witness Disclosure
New File Created****5***********

NOTC

CLAUSEN

Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript of
11/27/07 Hearing

John T. Mitchell

RTSV

SHEDLOCK

Return Of Service on Thomas Martinich (not
found)

John T. Mitchell

WlTD

BAXLEY

Expert Witness Disclosure of Defendants
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence

John T. Mitchell

HRVC

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on
John T. Mitchell
05/12/2008 09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 5 Days
- 1st Priorty

ORDR

CLAUSEN

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute
Real Party in Interest

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/23/2008 04:OO
PM) Presentment of Judgment

John T. Mitchell

VlCTORlN

Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court
John T. Mitchell
($86.00 Directly to Supreme Court Plus this
amount to the District Court) Paid by: John
Whelan Receipt number: 0787294 Dated:
3/19/2008 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: [NONE]

BNDC

VlCTORlN

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 787296 Dated
311912008 for 100.00)

John T. Mitchell

APSC

VlCTORlN

Notice of Appeal To The Supreme Court

John T. Mitchell

NOTE

VlCTORlN

Clerk's Certificate to Supreme Court

John T. Mitchell

HRVC

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/23/2008
04:OO PM: Hearing Vacated Presentment of
Judgment

John T. Mitchell

APSC

MCCORD

Amended Appealed To The Supreme Court

John T. Mitchell

NOTC

JANUSCH

Notice of Transcript Lodged-Julie Foland

John T. Mitchell

John T. Mitchell

PAGE
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.JAR,fES, V E m O X & t%-EEKS,P.A.
1873 N. Ldkewood Dr., Ste. 200
Coeur dlAlene, ID 53814
Telephone. (209) 667-0685
Facsimile: (205) 664-1684

ISB #4255

1

Attorneys for Pjaintiff

IN T& DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

S/IATE
OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAT
TOWER ASS+ SUB TPiC., a Delaware
corporation, 1
Plaintiff,

I

1
DOUGLAS L A ~ N C and
E BRENDA J.
VS.

I Case No. CV 03-4621
I
I

&EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
RENEWED RilOTION FOR SUiMMARY
JII'DGMENT

LAWRI3-CE, busband and wife,

Defendants.

~ c f c n d h appealed
t
this Court's rulings that: (1) Plaintiff had standing to bring a suit
against ~efendbntn:(2) that the suit should not be dismissed for failure to name an indispensable

I

party (thc land1 rd); and (3) that there was an express easement. T11e Supreme Court upl~eldthe
I

trial cowt7srulmgs that Plaintiff had standing to bring Ille action and that t l ~ csuit sl~ouldnot be
I

dismissed for fhilure to name an indispensable party. The Court concluded tl~at:"Tower wi 11
I
have standing do seek injunctive relief if it can establish it has an allcged lcgal right to bcncfit
I

MEblORhNDUM IN SUPPORT OF REEEW-ED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 1

023

MI

14

Prom the Blossoin M o u n t ~ nRoad easement. As lessee of the alleged dominant estate, Tower
derives its right to use the alleged easement from its lessor, Hall." Tmtler Asser Sub INC t..
Lawrefice, 143 Idaho 710. 152 P.3d 581, 583 (2007) A rerni'tt1t-t~was issued Februaxy 20, 2007.
Defendants have taken no M ~ e action
r
on tlle case. This renewed stunma0 judg-ent raises for

the Court's consideration those otl~ertheories of easement raised by Plaintiff in its complaint.
Althougt~contained in the original slltnmazy judgment, for ease of argument, this menlorandurn
rejterates those facts and arguments previous1y raised.

I. UNDTSPUTED FACTS

1.

Tlze Defendants! Doug and Brenda Lawrence, o w a fee simple interes*jtx real

property describcd as the Northcast Q~axterof the Southeast Quarter, the East half of the
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter and the East half of the Southeast Quarter of the
Soutlleast Quarter, all located in Section 21, Townshp 50 North, Range 5 Wcst Boise Meridian,
Kootenai County, Idaho hereiizaftm referred to as the "Lawrence parcel". (See Weelcs Affidavit:
filed herein.)
2.

The relevant portions of the chain of title of the Lawrence parcel are as foilows:

Pike W. Reyxolds and Agnes E. Reynolds, I~usbandand wife, owlled the parent puccl Erom

which the Lawrence parcel was later segregated, then tmzsfenred it to Edwaxd P, Raden and
Colleen J. Raden, husband and wife, and l-lasold I?. Marcoe and Vxola G. Marcoc, lzusband and
wife. Radcns and Marcoes trailsferred the pasent parcel to Harald A. F m k and Marle-ne A. F~mk,

husband and wife. Funks segregated and transferred the Lawrence parcel to T-Turnan Synergistics,

Inc., a Minnesota corporation. Human Syngergistjcs, Inc. t ~ a l s f m e dthe Lawrence parcel to Don

E. Johnston and Fern -4. Johnston, husband and wife, and John McHugh and Mary Ann
bfEhfORANDUM

SUPPORT OF RENETVED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 2
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h$cHugh, llusband and wife. Jahnstans a11d McT-lud~sthcn transferred the Luwrencc parcel to
Nat~onalhssociated Propefiies. Lnc.. an Idaho Corpora6on. National Assoeimcd Properties. Inc.
btrans-ferrcd the Lawencc parccl ia Arman and Mary Jane Fmmanian, I-rusbat~d
and \'~.ife.
Amm
md bFYlwy Jane Fmanism sold the property to Doug and Brenda Lawrence, husband a t ~ dwife.
See Weeks Affidavit in Suppox? of Motion for Summary I-t~dgment,
Esihibits A-I.

3.

Plaintiff Spectra Site was assigned a leasellold interest with Ma& md Robert Hall

in a parcel of property situated in the Sot~tliwestQuarter o.F Section 22, TOWI~SIUP
SO North,
Range 5 West, Boise hleridian, Kooienai County, Tdaho as described in the Complaint and

2Ufidavitof Dan Rebear previously filed herein on Judy 22,2003.
4.

The relevant

portions ofthe chain of title ofthe Hall parcel is as follows:

Pjlce W. Reynolds and Agnes E. Reynolds, husband and wik, owned the Southtvesr Quarter of
Sect~on22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County Idaho (parent

parcel) from which the Wall parcel was later segregated. Reynolds transfel-red the parent parcel to
Edward P. Radea and Colleen J. Raden. husband and wifc, and Harold I?. Marcoe and Vjola G.

Marcoe, husband and wife. Radcns and Mxcoes transferred the parent parcel to Harold A. Funk
and Marlene A. Funk, husband and wife. Funks segregated and eansfmred the fIall parcel to
.Totm Rasmussen and Neil Chamberlain. Rasmussen and Chamberlain then transferred the parcel

to James and Teresa Van Sky. Van Skys transfened the parcel to Switzer C o m u ~ i c a t i o n sInc.
.

Switzer Comunications next transferred tlie pace1 to Term Corp. Term Corp. thcn iransferrcd
the property to Mark Hall and Robert I-Eall. Mark I-Iall and Robert Hall leascd t11e site to Nextel
West Corp. Nextel West Corp. assigned its lease to Spectra Site. See Weeks Affidavit.

MEMOWNDUhl I N SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY J'LJDGMENT: 3
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5.

Bath thc Spectra Sitc parccl and the Lawreucc parcel were 11eld in unity of title

until they were segregated by Harold mid MaIene Frmk. See Wceks Affidavit.
6.

A private road traverses the Lawreilce parcel in tile Southeast Quwler of Section

21. A survey of this road as it crosses thc Lawrence parcel was recorded June 15, 1998 and
placed the portion of the private casement road in the Southeast Quarter of Section 2 1 as lying
within Tax ParceI No. 21-8500. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of h'foti011far Summary
.Judgment, Exhibit 2. The parccl over v+rhichthis surveyed road is now jdenlified

sls

Kaotenai

County Tax Parcel No. SONOSW-21-9000 because it was segregated out from Tax Parcel No. 21-

8500 in 1999 after the survey was recorded. This parcel co~ttinuesto be owned by Lawences.
See Weeks Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits P and AA.

7.

In October 1966, General Telephone Corporation ("GTC") acquired a parcel of

property from Reynolds located in the Soutlfwcst Quarter of Section 2'6, Township ST) North,
Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai Cou~ity,Idaho The deed granimg the parcel in Section

22 lo GTC also included an access easement over the Southeast Quarter of Section 2 1 (the
Lawrence PaxceI) and the Southwest Quarter of Section 22, Townshp 50 North, Range 5 West,

of Motion for
Boise Meridian, Kootcnai County, Jdal~o.See Weeks Affidavit in S~~pport

S u m a r y Judgment, Exhbits V and Exhibit FF, Wenker Afidavit. In July 19GG, GTC obtained
a Right of Way Easement over the Southwest Quarter of Section 21, Townshp 50 North, Range

5 West Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Ida110 for access to its equipment situated on Blossom
Mountain. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of hfotion Fbr Summary Judgment, Exhibit W. In
August 1966, GTC obtained a Right of Way Easement over the North Hal F o f the Northeast
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Quarter of Section 28, Township 50 North. Range 5 West Boisc hferidim. Kootenai County.

Idaho. See Weeks Affidavit: ia Suppoxt ol: Ri/lotian for S m a r y Judgment, Exhibit X.

8

In 1967, CTC had a detail ofthe acccss road prepared by an engineer, together

with detllils of its commmication facility The detail of the access road showcd the private

easement road as ieaving the county road, Iravcrslng southeast tl~roughtbt: SoutIlwest Quarter of
Section 2 1, then entering into the Nortli Half of Section 28 wherc it traveled soutl~ezzstfor a
distance in Section 25 and then turned northeast for the remainder of the distance, then entering
the Southeast Q~~arter
oFSection 21 and traversing northeasterly through the 1,awrence parcel
m d continuing northeasterly tl-rrough the Soutl~westQuarter of Section 22. ,Ee Weeks Affidavit

in Support of h4otion for S u m a r y .Tudgrnent, Exhibit Y. CTC's dctail map sl~owstlze road in d ~ e
same location as it existed and was used by F~lnkduring hrs otwlership. See F W I ~
AMidavit.

9.

The private road used by GTC and Funk was ale only existing road that provided

access to the parcels at the time that FLIII~S
purchased the property. See Funk Affidavit.
10.

In July 1975,Funks sold the Soutl~eastY4 of the Southeast Y4 of Scction 2 1,

To~vnsl~ip
50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian la Human Synergistics, Inc. At the time of.
the sale, Funks continued to own the property located in the Soutl~westQuarter of Section 22.

W ~ e nthe sales agreement was drafted, it included a clause to address Funks' access across the
Section 2 1 parccl being sold to allow continued access to their property in Section 22. Jtem 5 of
tl~eagreement indicated that the Sectlnn 21 parcel bcing sold was subject to an ingress egress
easement in favor of the property still held by Funlcs ovcr the existing road on the property that
was being sold to Human Synergistics. See 'CVeeks nffdavit in Support of &lotion for Summary
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Judgment, Exhibit E. It was not Funks' intent to latld Ioclc their Section 22 propeny upon thc

sale of thi: Section 2 1 property. It was Funks intcnt to assure that they retained an easement over
the existing road located in the So~ttlzeas?Quarter of Scetion 21 far ingress and egrcss to the
property they coll.tinued to own in Se~tiorz22. See Funk Affidmit. Fudc continued to use the

private road for ingress and egress to Section 22 after the sale of the Section 21 property. See

Funk Affidavit.
1 1.

In 1996, Latvrenccs' irnmcdiate predecessors in title, Armaa and Mat-y Jane

Fannmian, granted a written easement in Savor of John Mack over the private easement for
ingress and egress to his l a d s located in the So~~ihwest
Qusxtcr of Sccrcion 22, whicl~lye obtained
Erorn 13arold and Marlene Funk. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of Motion for Suinznary
Judgmer~t,Exhibit EE. In granting this casement, Fannanians recogn~zedthis private road as the
"historic access" for Mack and his predecessors in intcrest ~rsedfor access to their parccls in

Section 22. Mack's predecessors in interest were the Funks. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit TI.
13.

The easement road was visible at the time Lawrences purchased their property.

See Wcelcs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Sumnary Jud,vment, Exhibits GO and 1-TH.

TI.

S'L'h4MARY JUDGR4ENT STANDARDS_

The law is well established in Idaho that on a motion for st~mmaryjudgment, the trial
court must determine whether the pleadings, deposition, and admissions, together wit11 &~davits,
show that thcre is no gentline issue as to any material fact and that thc moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Bonz v , Sfidwceh, 1 19 Ida110 539,541,808 P.2d
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876,578 (1 991). The brrrden of proving thc absence of an issue of material fact rests at all times
upan the moving party. .McCr~y1'. Lyom, 120 Idaho 765, 769,520 P.2cl360.364 (1991); G C11' 144
Fiarn.~s1) Fank ir~igationGo., 119 Idaha 5 14, 5 17, 808 P.2d 85 1.854 (1 991).
Isid10 ,

ln ,X R. Simpfor Cu. v. Rose4

-P.3d -(S.Ct. Opinion 3 1706.2006).

the court sel forth the requirement when thc case is a co~urttrial:
" W e n an action will be tried befare the court without a jury, the trial
court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive al the most probable inferences based
upon the undisputed evidicnce properly before it and grant tlie summary judgmcnt
dcspite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Shawver v. H ~ c k f e h e n -Esrufea,
y
L.L.C., 140 Id&o 354, 360-61, 93 P.3d 685,691-92 (2004). "The test for
reviewing the inferences drawn by t l ~ etrial, court is whether the record reasonably
supports 'the inferences." Td.

111.

DACKGROrnD

AS noted above, a private easement road has existcd s i ~ ~at
c eleast 1966 whicli traversed
portions of Sections 21,22 and 28 to access propetty in thc Southwest Qusuter of Section 22,

Townsl~ip50 North, Range 5 West Boise Iblaidian, Kootenai Coxu~ty,Idaho. This case arises
from a dispute regarding the right of Tower to use the private easemmt road to access its leased
property in the Southcvest Quarter of Section 22 (Section 22 parcel) as it traverses the property in
the South~vestQuarter of Section 21 (Section 21 parcel) owned by the Lawrences.

Both the Hall Section 22 parcel and the Lawrence Section 21 parcel were once part of a
larger tract held under one common ownership prior to n division of the parccls by the Funks. A
private road existed which provided access to bath parcels. Altl~oughits origin is unknown, it is

apparcnt that GTC obtiLincd an easement over the road as early as 1966. Prior to the separation

by Funks of the Lawrences' Section 21 parcel from the parent parcel. the private road across the
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Section 21 parcel had been used by Funks as thc exclusive means to access their pr0per.t~in

Section 21 and Section 22. Even after thc sepaaclon of the Section 21 parcel. Funlcs continued to
USE

the private easement road .to access &cir Secti~n22 parcel, and it was later used by Hall for

access to their segegated parcel in Section 22.
IV.

A.

ARCUMEXT

Easement by Implication

An easement can be formed by implicatioti from prior use. In order to cstablish an
easement by implication from prior use, the party trying to estabilsh such a11 easement must
demonstrate (I) u t y of title or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominani
estate; (2) apparent continuous use; and (3) the easement mnsl be reasonably necessary to the

proper enjoment of the dominant estatc. Bear island W;rferAssn. v. Brown, 125 I d d ~ o717,
725,874 P.2d 528. 536 (1 994); Cardwefl v. ,S"Plcrith, 105 Idaho 71,77,665 P.2d 1081, 1087

(Gt..4pp. 1983): Close v Reixsink, 95 Tdaho 72, 76. 501 P.2d 1383. 1387 (1972), Davis v Cowlen,

33 Idaho 204,210,360 P.2d 403,406-407 (1 961). Apparent continuous use refers to the use
before the separation of the parcels that would indicate the roadway was intended to provide
permsmcnt: access to tlte parcels. Curdwell v Smith, supra, at 78,665 P.2d at 1088. Strict
necessity 1s not required for the creation of an implicd easement by prior use. All that is required
is reasonable necessity, Thomas v Adadven, 142 Idaho 635. 132 P.3d 392 (2006). The party
seeking to establish the easement ltas the burden of providing the facts to establish tlte easement.
Id. a? 77,665 P.2d at 1087.
Zn its later pronouncements, the Idaho Supreme Court expanded the law on easements by

implication in Davis v Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999). In Davis, the plaintiffs
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(Davis) sought to protect asl easement over thc propetty of defmdmt ((Pcacocli).Tlte parties'
predecessors in interest establ~shedan easeln~ljtby resewE1Cioi1 to protect access to what later

became the Davis parcel, ovcr artd across t l ~ ePeacock parcel. Thc road was the only usabjc

mems o f access to the Dax~ispareel antil the Davis's conswlcted another road along the south
side of tlieir propefiy, also providing access. The Peacocks then blocked the original r o d , axid

Davis brougl~ta quiet title action to establish an easement by implication across the original road.
The trial court held that an easement by irnpIications existed and the Tdaho Supreme Corn?
upheld the ruling.

Thc Idal~oSupreme Co~utin rcaching its decision first held that the slacccssors in interest
to the original grantors of property could assert easement rights by i~nplicdor prior use. The
court noted:

[W] e believe there is no equitable reason for the distinction between grantors and
grantees in the area of implied easeinents by prior use. One of tlte requirements
for establjsbing an implied easernsnt by prior use is that there Iias becn open ,and
continuous use of the casement prior to the severance of thc dominant and
servient estates. This requirement ensures 111at thc buyer of the sentient property
will havc notice of the preexisting use. Consequently, it is equitable to impose an
easement on a buyer who already had lot ice of its existence. Tf~erefore,we hold
that a successor in interest to the o17ginalgrantor o F the scrvtent property can
claim an implied easement by prior use.
Davis, 233 Idaho at 641-42,99 1 P.2d at 366-367. The court also reaffilmed that an impli.ed
easement by prior use docs not require strict necessity, but raaer, only reasonable necessity. The
court noted:

Pcacoc1.c.argues that tlte Russclls also had access to their residence because
the land they owned was bordered by Idaho Street on the west. He contends that,
because the Russcll pt-opcrty was not landlocked, thcre was always access to the
residence across their o w property. Therefore. use of the disputed road \xas
neither necessary, nor provided the only usable means of access lo the residence.
Peacock's argument would be persuasive if strict necessity were required for an
implied casement by prior use. T-iowever, as our cases have made clear,
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reasonable necessity is something less thnn thc g e a t present neec.ssity
required for an essemenl implied by nccessi* See Bear island W&CYAs.r h,
125 Idaho at 725.574 P.2d 53 6. 131 Bear lsfund W ~ f e pA.CP
. '17, tue held that no
implied easemcnt by prior use or neccssjty had been created. Id However. in so
holding. we stated that the establishment of an eascment by necessity required m
"even weightier showing of a great present necessity for the easement," as
compared to the reasonable nccessity required fool-an casement by prior use. Iii:
Td, 133 Idaho at 642, 992 P.2d 15 367 (emphasis added). Finally, the court in Davis stated that an

easement by implication is not extinguisl~edevcn if the necessity no longer exists. In
discussing this issue, the court held as fa1tows:

Vlhile tl$s issue has not been previously addressed by our Court, it appears the
well-established rule is that, u~llikcan ezlsemcnt by way of necessity, an implied
easement by prior use is not later extinguisl3ed jf thc easement is no longer
reasorial3Jy nccessary.
This long standing rule 1s based on the theory that when someone conveys
properly, they dso intend to convey whatever is required for the beneficial use

and enioyment of that prope;rty, and intends to retain all that is required for tlie use
and enjoyment of the land retained. Consequently, an easement implied by prior
use is a true easement of a permanent duration. rather than a temporary easement
which exists only as Tong as the necessity continues. See, e.g,, No~fcenv.
McGnhan, 823 P.2d 622,631 (AIaska 1991); Thornpan v. Schuh, 593 P.2d 1138,
1 145 (Oregon 1979); Story v. IJeficr, 540 P.2d 562, 566 (Okla. 1975).
Additionally, an implied eascment by prior use is appurtenant to thc land and
therefore passes with all ssubsequellt conveyances of tlie dominmt and servient
estates. See Iiughes v State, 80 Idal-ro 286,328 P.2d 39'7 (1958); I.C. 9 55-603
(stating that a transfer of real property also includes all easements attached to the
property).
Applying these rules to thc facts of this case, we agree with the diskict c o w that
because use of the road was reasonably necessary for the beneficial use of the
Da14scs' property at tht: time of severance, an iinplied easement by prior use arose
at that lime. Because that irnplicd easement is not extinguished by tile end of the
necessity, the easement became appuT-tenantto the land and was subsequently
transferred to the Davises at the time they purchased their property.

In the present case, there was unity of title at the time of the severance of the dominant
and servisnt estate. The road was in use by the Funks prior to the severance and was thcir so1.e
access to both the Section 21 and Section 22 properties. It ivas their intent after the severance to

mMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED kIOTION FOR SUMh/t\RY .TUDGMENT: I a

continuc to use the road as their access. Tl-rus. use ofthe easement was reasonably necessary for
13t3

beneficial Ltse of the domiamt estate (Sectioi~22 property) at the time of thc severance.

Givcn these elements, there was an implied easement by prior use which is appuncnant to the

Capstx parcel.
El. Prescriptive Easement

The law of prescriptive casements was reiterated by the Court in A k w s

li

DL. fiT/igifc

Consptrucfinlz,~ R C .142 Idaho 293. 303. 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005)- wherein tl-le court noted:

A party seeking to establish the existence of an casement by prescription "must
prove by elcar and convincing evidei~ceuse of the subject property, w11icl1 is
chmacterized as: (1) open and notorious; (2) cotttinuous and uninterrupted; (3)
adverse and under a claim o.f right: (4) with the actual or imputed kno.cvledge of
the owner ofthe servient tenement ( 5 ) for the statutory period.'' (Cite omitted,)
The statutory period ill question i s five years. (Cites omitted.) A claimant may
rely on his own use. or l-re " h a y rely on the adversc use by tlic claimant's
predecessor for the prescriptive pcriod, or thc claimant may combine such
predecessor's use with tile claimant's own use to cstal~lishthe requisite five
eoi~tinuousyears of adverse use." (Cite omitted.). Once the claimant presents
proof of open, notorious, conti~~uous,
uninterrupted use of the claimed right far
the prcseriptive period, even .cvithout evidence of how the use began, hc raises the
presumption that the use was adverse o;nd under a claim of right. (Cites omitted.)
The burden then shifts to the ozvner of the servient tenement to show that tlic
claimant's use was pcmissive, or hy virtue of a license, contract, or agreement.
(Cites omitted.) The nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servicnt
owncr's claims to the propefiy." The state of mind of the users of the alleged
easement is not conhalling; the focus is on the natwe of their use.
In Cardenas v. Kjtrrpjuwoit 1 14 Idaho 79,53, 753 P.2d 280,294 (1988), the Supreme Court held:
A ""claim of dght" signifies use without recognition of the rights oSfthe servient
estate's owner.(Cite omitted.). The general rule is that proof of open, notorious,
continuous and u~linterrupteduse for the statutory period raises tbe rebuttable
presumption that the usc was adverse and iuzder a claim of right. (Cite omitted.)
Nonctheless, as stated in Simmnns: "The use of a driveway in cornlnon w ~ t hthe
ewer and the general public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's
pat indicating a sepaxatc and exclusive use on his part- negatives any presumption
of individual right thercin in his favor."
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When tlie road providing access to the FulLks' Section 21 atid Section 22 parcels was
own. It is known ?hatjt was there as early as 1966. 11 is undisputed that

Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 parcel and their Section 22 parcel
prior to s e g e g a h g the parccls. M e n Funks sold the Section 21 parcel to Human Syncrgistics,
they included in the sales contract language thai gave notice that they intended to continue to use
the road for ingress and egress to their retained Section 22 parcel. This langtmge providcd notice

they were claiming a right to use the road in the future for ingress md egress to thcir retslined
lands. It is undisputed that Funks and their predecessors then proceeded to use the road openly,
continuotrsly, wi.tf.tnut inlemption, under a ciairn of right for the statutory period. F;lrma~-iians
(a
predecessor of Lawrence) granted a an express easement for ingcss/egress to a portion of
Section 22 to Funks' predecessor, Mack, recognizing Mack had a right to the easement because
it was the historical access to Section 22. Thus, there is also a prescriptive easement across t h i s

road.
C.

Easement by Necessity

An easwnent by necessity lias somc similar elements to an easement by prior use. The
Court in B&IDevelnpms~f& Inv., Inc. v. Parsons, 1.26 Idaho 504, 887 P.2d 49 ( c t . ~ 1994)
~ ~ .
noted:
To cseablish an easement by necessity, thc claimnant rn~istprove the following
elements: (1) that the dominant parcel and the servient parcel were once part of a
larger tract ~mdercommon ownership; (2) that the necessity for the easement
claimed over the servient estate exisred at !he tI'mc- of tkle severaace; and (3) the
present necessity for the claimed easement is great. MacCaskiil v. Ehbcrf, 1 12
Idaho 1 1 15, 11 18, 739 P.2d 41 4,4 17 (C1.App. 1987) (emphasis added). An
easement by necessity is a creature of public policy. Rob Dn~liefs& Sons 1:
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Feavev, I06 Idaho 535,543,613 1 P,2d 101i),lD1S ( C a p p , 2 984). Therefore, t11:lre

easement does not depend on an express mutual agreement. Ra&ej-, it arises, and
will be recognized, wlwn the three required elements 11avc bee12 estahlislled,
Establishment of an casement by necessity i s not defeated by a contrary
expectation h~l?oredby one of the pm.ies. ;bZtncCaskili. 1 12 Tdaha a t 1 119, 739
P.2d at 4-41ri, It is a questioll of law. An o\mer af propelt-y. kowever, C W R ~ create
the necessity by his or her own actions. Car&)ell v. Siniih, 105 Xdaho 71, 80, 665
P.2d 1081, 1090 (Gt.Agp, t 983).
h~the present casc, t l ~ cdominvnl parcel and the scrvicnt parcel were once part of a larger tract

under c o r n o n owership. At the time of the severance, the necessity for the easement across the
Lawence parcel existed. This necessity continues today as no other method o f road access
exists to the parcel. Therefarc, the elements of an easement by necessity exists.
V.

CONCLUSTON

For the foregoing seasons and under the foregoing legal tllearies, the Court sl~ouldg a r
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment auld issue a p m m e n t injunction prohibiting

Defendmts from -Further blocking Plaintiff's access.

DATED this 14thday of May, 2007.
JAIVES?VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

i)7@i%b

BY:
Attorneys for Plaintie
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i hereby certify that on the 14"' day of May, 2007.1 csused to be served a truc and col~cct

copy of thc foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

U 3. Mail

a

Overni&t Mai I

TZ1

Telccopy (FAX)

John P. Whelan
2 13 4"' Street
Coeur d3Alenc,ID 83 5 16
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IN THE SG'fPmME ~ C ) U R TOF THE STATE OF IDAHO

"

P

)

Lewiston, August 2006 Term

1

Plain tiff-Respondent,

)

1

v.

2007 Opinion No. 14

)
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )

Filed: January 26,2007

LA

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

1

NCE, husband and wife,

)
)

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, for the County of Kootenai. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge.
The summary judgment order is vacated and the case is remanded.
John P. Whelan, P.C., Coeur d7AIene,for appellants.
Owen, James, Vernon and Weeks, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Susan
P. Weeks argued.

JONES, Justice
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence appeal to this Court from a summary judgment
order declaring the existence of a thrty foot wide express easement across their property
in favor of Tower Asset Sub Inc. We vacate the summary judgment and remand to the
district court for further proceedings.

1.
This is the second of two cases involving the same basic question - whether
property owned by the Lawrences is subject to an express easement for access to other
property located near its eastern side.
Company v. Lawrence, 2006 WL

In the first case, Capstar Radio Operating
, we considered the same two instruments

that are involved in this case and determined that summary judgment in favor of Capstar

was not appropriate because the documents m question did not unambiguously g a n t an
express easement over the Lawrence property.

Capsfur focused prirnanly upon the

wording of a 1975 sale agreenlent and secondarily upon a 1992 wananty deed. The
decision here deals primarily with the deed.
This case involves the right to use a private road, known as Blossom Mountain
Road, located on Blossom hIountaia, south of Post Falls. Blossorn Mountain Road
traverses the Lawrence property, which is located in the southeast quarter of section 21
(the "Lawrence parcel"), crossing into the southwest quarter of section 22, where Robert
Hall owns certain property (the "Hall parcel"). Tower Asset Sub Inc. currently leases and
occupies the Hail parcel.
The Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were once part of a single tract of land
under the common ownership of Harold and Marlene Funk. In 1975, the Funks divided
their land and sold what is now the Lawrence parcel to H m a n Synergistics, Inc. while
retaining the southwest quarter of section 22. The Funks and H u a n Synergistics signed
a sale agreement, which set forth that the parcel bought by Human Synergistics was:
5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and
adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and
including an ingress egress easement over portions of Section 21
heretofore granted to the grantors. Said easement shall be over existing
roads until such time as all record owners shall agree to the relocation,
improvement and/or abandonment of all or any portions of any roads.
Seventeen years later, in 1992, the Funks executed and delivered a warranty deed
conveying the Lawrence parcel to H m a n Synergistics. The warranty deed stated that the
deed was given "in fblfillment of those certain contracts between the parties hereto dated
July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the conveyance of the above described property." In
1996, after a number of other conveyances, the Lawrences acquired ownership of their
parcel.
Tower initiated this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief when the
Lawrences refbsed to allow it to traverse Blossom Mountain Road. Tower argued it had
the right to use Blossom Mountain Road to access its parcel, and alleged six causes of
action to support its position: (1) express easement; (2) implied easement; (3) easement
by necessity; (4) easement by prescription; (5) injunctive relief; and (6) breach of

contrai;l.

After Tower moved for s u m a v judzoent, the district court ordered the

past~esto l m i t their discovery, briefing, and arguments to the issue of express easement,

and therefore did not address Tower's other causes of action. On s u m a r y judment, the
distrrct court detemined the deed was ambiguous, considered extrinsic evidence, and
ruled in fdvor of Tower on the express easement cause of action. The Lawrences appeal
that judLment.

11.

in this opinion, we address three issues: (1) whether Tower has standing; (2)
whether Hall is an indispensable party; and (3) whether the district court erred in
declaring the existence of an express easement on summary judgment. In their briefing
before this Court, the parties have argued a number of other issues but it is unnecessary to
address them as a result of our ruling on the latter issue.
M e n reviewing a s u m a r y judgment order, this Court applies the same standard
as the district court. Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 41 5, 419, 111 P.3d
100, 104 (2005). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).

"If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a

question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Infanger v. City of

Salmon, 137 Idaho 45,47,44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002).
A.

The Lawrences contend that Tower lacks standing to bring t h s suit because it
failed to demonstrate an ownership or leasehold interest in the dominant estate. Standing
is a subcategory of justiciability and is "a preliminary question to be determined by this
Court before reaching the merits of the case." Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389,
391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006). The district court's Order Granting Motion for S m a r y
Judgment and Entering Decree of Quiet Title granted: (1) a judgment quieting title in the
easement in favor of Tower, and (2) injunctive relief permanently restraining the
Lawrences from interfering with Tower's use of the easement. The question of standing
must be addressed with respect to each form of relief.

This Court has established that title o~vnershipis a prerequisite to quiet title to an
easernent appurtenant in fayor of a dominant estate. Beach Lateral H'ater Users Ass 'a v
ffarrison, 132 Idaho 600, 604, 130 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2006); Tuzgslen Holclzngs, h c . v.

Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 456, 459 (2006). However, we a g e e with the
Restatement (Third) of Property that an individual has standing to enforce the right to use
an easement if be or she has the right to benefit From the easement. Restatement (Third)
of Property: Semitudes S; 8.1 (2000). Therefore, title ownership of the dominant estate is
not a necessary prerequisite to obtain standing to enforce the right to use an easernent. Id.
Hall, who is not a party to this suit, is the record owner of the alleged dominant
estate.' As a result, Tower lacks standing to seek a quiet title declaration in its favor.
However, since standing to enforce the right to use an easement is consistent with the
right to benefit from the easement, Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if it
can establish it has an alleged legal right to benefit fkom the Blossom Mountain Road
easement. As lessee of the alleged dominant estate, Tower derives its right to use the
alleged easement from its lessor, Hall.
We hold that Tower, as lessee of the alleged dominant estate, has standing to seek
injunctive relief preventing the Lawrences from interfering with its alleged right to use
the easement, but lacks standing to seek to quiet title to the easement.

B.
The Lawrences argue that the district court erred in proceeding with t h s case
because Hall was an indispensable party to the litigation. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
19(a)(l) provides a party shall be joined if:
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the
person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.

Tower presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the benefit of the
access road across the Lawrence parcel. However, that does not establish an express easement, whch must
be created by a written instrument.

T b ~ sCourt has held that joinder of all parties with an ~nterestm the subject matter of the
suit is not required; rather, only those who have an interest in the object of the suit should
be joined. Pro hzdzvwo, Inc. v. itf~d-MzleHoldz~zgTrust, 131 Idaho 741, 746, 963 P.2d
1178, 1183 (1 998): ldalro I~zgazionGo. v. Dzll, 25 Idaho 71 1, 716, 139 P. 714, 716
(1914).

As we have already detemined that Tower does not have standing to bring a quiet
title action, we need not address whether Hall was an indispensable party to that portion
of this case. With respect to Tower's request for injunctive relief, Tower's objective is to
enforce its alleged right to use Blossom Mountain Road as an ingresslegress easement.
This determination can be made without affecting Hall's rights because Tower need not
quiet title to the easement in order to enforce any right it may have to use the easement.
Therefore, Hall is not an indispensable party to the request for injunctive relief.

c.
The Lawrences contend that the district court erred in declaring the existence of
an express easement over the Lawrence parcel. In reaching its conclusion, the district
judge held that the 1992 warranty deed fkom the Funks to Human Synergistics was
ambiguous2 and that the Funks intended to except an express easement across the
Lawrence parcel in favor of the Hall parcel.
An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is
not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. Akers v. D.L. White
Const., Inc. 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005). An express easement, being
an interest in real property, may only be created by a written instrument. Shultz v. Atkins,
97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976) (citing I.C. $ 9-503; McKeynolds v.
Harrigfeld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096 (1914)). "No particular forms or words of art are
necessary [to create an express easement]; it is necessary only that the parties make clear
their intention to establish a servitude." Benninger v. Denfield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129
P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006) (quoting Seccornbe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433,436, 767 P.2d 276,
279 (Ct. App. 1989)). An express easement may be created by a written agreement

Of interest is the fact that in Capstar the same district judge determined the sale agreement and deed to be
unambiguous. There is no explanation as to why the deed would be unambiguous in that case, whle it is
ambiguous in this case.

between the owner of the dominant estate and the owner of the seniient e s t a k 3 It may
also be created by a deed from the owner of the senrient estate to the owner of the
dominant e ~ t a t e .Mihere
~
the owner of the dominant estate is selling the property to be
subjected to the servitude, an express easement may be created by reservation or by
exception. "An express easement by reservation reserves to the grantor some new right
in the property being conveyed; an express easement by exception operates by
withholding title to a portion of the conveyed property." Akers, 142 Idaho at 301, 127
P.3d at 204.

In Capstar, the district court determined that the sale agreement, w h c h had been
recorded in the county records prior to the recording of the warranty deed, was effective,
in and of itself, to create an express easement by written agreement. We determined that
the language in the sale agreement was insufficient on its face to establish an express
easement. As an additional ground for granting s m a r y judgment, the district court
cited Seccornbe v. Weeks, whch we found to be inapplicable. In addition, we expressed
reservations about the precedential value of its holding.
As it did in Capstar, the district court held Seccornbe to be controlling in this
case. For the same reasons we stated in Capstar, that holding is in error and must be
vacated.

In its bench ruling, the district court also determined the 1992 warranty deed to be
ambiguous because it made reference to the sale agreement. The district court indicated
that this and other evidence established the Funks' intent to "keep ingress and egress
open" over the Lawrence parcel. However, the Funks' intent, whatever it may have been,
is not sufficient to substitute for a writing that is effective to grant, reserve, or except an
express easement. In Capstar, we held that the language of the sale agreement is
insufficient to establish an express easement. There is no language in either the sale

The record includes such an agreement. Shortly before the Lawrences purchased their property, their
predecessors in interest entered mto a written agreement with the owner of property m the southwest
quarter of section 22, granting him a forty foot wide nonexclusive ingress and egress easement over the
portion of the Lawrence property traversed by Blossom Mountain Road. The property to be benefited by
this easement was near to, but did not include, the Hall property.
4
The record includes a deed wherein a predecessor in interest of the Funks granted an easement over the
portion of Blossom Mountain Road traversing the Lawrence property to the General Telephone Company
of the Northwest. That deed, dated October 16, 1966, benefited property owned by General Telephone in
the southwest quarter of section 22, but not the Hall property.
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ageement or the 1992 warranty deed, whether tile documents are considered separately
or in conibination, that is sufficient to establish an express easement.
Final resolution of this case u~ouldhave been expedited, had the district court. not
confined its inquiry to the express easement issue. Based on evidence submitted to the
court, certain of the other theories showed greater promise from Tower's standpoint and
it is unfodunate that those theories were not h l l y developed and decided upon. By
confining its consideration to the express easement issue, justice in this case has been
delayed. We hold that the district court erred in its conclusion that an express easement
existed in favor of the Hall parcel, and we therefore vacate the summary judgment.

111.
The district court's order for summary judgment is vacated and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Chief Justice SCJXROEDER, and Justices TROUT and BURDICK CONCUR.

Justice EISMANN, concurring in part and concurring in the result.
I concur in Parts lI.A. and I1.B. of the majority opinion, and 1 concur in the result
with respect to Part I1.C.
The district court's finding of an express easement in this case was based upon the
1992 warranty deed from the Funks to Human Synergistics. The contract provided that
the sale was:

5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and
adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and
including an ingress egress easement over portions of Section 21
heretofore granted to the grantors.
1
&w6
had executed a deed conveying the property to Human
.
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warranty deed on November 18, 1992. That deed did not reserve or grant any easement.
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easement.
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~ c0.G did not explain how it could have done so.
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Under the doctrine of merger, any recltals in the real estate contract were merged
into the deed. As we stated in Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Ikc., 90 Idaho 373, 382, 414
P.2d 879, 884 (1966) (quoting Contirzental Li$e Ins. Go. v. Smith, 64 P.2d 377 W.M.)),
"When a deed is delivered and accepted as perfomance of the contract to convey, the
contract is rnerged in the deed. Thoush the terns of the deed may vary &om those
contained in the contract, the deed alone must be looked to to determine the rights of the
parties . . . ." There is no question that the deed in t h s case was delivered and accepted

in perfomance of the real estate contract. It recites that it was.
This deed is given in Fulfillment of those certain contracts between the
parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the conveyance of
the above described property, and the covenants and warraaty herein
contained shall not apply to any title, interest or encumbrance arising by,
through or under the purchaser in said contract, and shall not apply to any
taxes, assessments or other charges levied, assessed or becoming due
subsequent to the date of said contract.
The recital does not incorporate the contract by reference, but merely excludes fkom the
warranties of title, quiet enjoyment, and against encumbrances any defect arising out of
the purchaser's conduct during the time from the contract of sale to the issuance of the
warranty deed. Thus, under the doctrine of merger, any purported reservation or grant of
an easement in the real estate contract would be irrelevant. The district court erred in
attempting to create an easement based upon the real estate contract.
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In the Supreme Court o f the State ofdldaho
TOiVER ASSET SUB ING., a Delawue
corporatio~i,
Plairiti ff-Respondent,

1
1
1
?

RIMITTITUR

)

1
?

V.

DOUGLAS P. L A W E N C E and Bl3ENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants.
TO:

NO. 32092

1
1
1
?

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI.

The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause January 26, 2007, which
has now become final; thereFore,
IT IS HEREBY O R D E E D that the District Court shall forthwith comply with
the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required.
DATED this 2ot" day of February, 2007.

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge

SLTSkY P. WEEKS
JAkIES. VERNON & 'U7EEKS,P.A.
1875 N.Lakexwood Dr., Ste. 200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14

Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (203) 664-1 684
TSB if4255

Attorneys for Plaintiff

THE D I S W C T COURT OF THE FIRST IUD?)ICIhLDISTRICT OF TKE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

T O W R ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware
corporation,

(

RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JTDGMENT

Plaintiff.
VS.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husbmd and wife,
Defendants.

Case No, CV 03-4621

I

I

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, by and ihrough their attorney of record, and moves t h e

Court pursuant to LR.C.P. 56 for a1 order granting summary judgment in favor of the abovenamed Plaintiff for relief demanded in the complaint.

The grounds for this motion are that there is no genuine issue in this case as to any
material fact and the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment ns a matter of law. This motion is based

RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JC'DGMENT: 1

upan I .R.C.P. 56. the anachcd memorandum in suppart o f U~ismatinn. and the affidavits and
docume~ltson file herein.

Oral argummt i s respectfully requested.

DATED this 1 4t1'day of May, 2007.
.TAMES, VEREON & %%EKS, P.A.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

I hereby certify that on the 14"' day of May. 2007.1 caused to be servcd a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

U

U.S. Mail

C)vcrnigltt Mail

d

Hand Delivered

Telecopy (FAX)

John P. Whelan
2 13 1.1.~Sttect
C o ~ u d'
r Alene, TD 83816

RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JU'DGrnNT: 2

05)39/2057

16 50 F,b,X

~gg?~

6642240

@%#gg>S34

John

P

'//neLan, P

;I

&fgh*i
r i iL U t P I
&9CS.t.*

@q$?

V*<&&+

4g*,

*A?

"r,"

j
*
,

JOHN P, WMELAN, P.G,
21 3 N. 4'h Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Tele,; (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

CASE NO. CV-03-04621
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN

HEARING DATE: June 13, 2007
TIME:

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

1

1
)

County of Kootenai

3:00 p.m.

ss.

1

I. John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.
Lawrence.

I am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda
I have personal knowledge of rhe following facts and could

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEL4N

-1

0-18

competently testify. This affidavit is filed in support of Defendants' motion for
enlargement.

The Defendants have not had the opportunity to gather the

2.

affidavits and deposition testimony needed to oppose Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment. It: is the intent of Defendants to take the deposition of each
witness who has filed an affidavit for Plaintiffs in this action. Unfonunately, the
witnesses are scattered across the United States and Defendants have not been
able to track down each witness, much less take their depositions. So additional
time i s needed to oppose the Plaintiff's rnotion for summary judgment, I would
estimate that an additional sixty (60) days from the date scheduled for the
motions Oune 1 3, 2007) would be sufficient.

The motion for enlargement on behalf of Defendants is made on the

3.

additional ground that, in the case of Capstar, Plaintiff only noticed-up i t s
Motion for Summary Judgment yesterday, as it had previously scheduled only a
motion shortening time for June 13, 2007. Additionally, the Plaintiff has failed
to last or articulate which part of the Court records is being relied upon for the
facts in support of i t s motion.

I am therefore forced to search through

thousands of pages of my files pertaining to this matter to determine what
issues must be addressed.

Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel did not give any

advance notice of her intent to pursue two separate motions for summary
judgment.

AFFIDAVIT

OF JOHN P. WWELAN - 2

BATED this

-50 day

of May, 2007.

Whelan
y for Defendants
Subscribed and sworn before me this

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHElAN

-3

30

day o f May, 2007.
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90day of May, 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon B Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1 875 N, Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814
.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

c

J O n. w
~ m ~ mP,
21 3 N 4T" street
Caeur d' Mcnc, Idaho 83 8 14
T e k (208) 664-5891

Fax. (208) 664-2240
ISBg 6983

IN

D I S m C T COURT OF THE FIRST J'UDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF iDAHO,

A N D FOR

TOWER ASSET SUE3 WC,
a Delewate Corporation

1

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CASE NO. CV-03-4621

1
)

AFFTDA-T OF JOHN
MACK 11V SUPPORT OF

)

DEFENDANTS MOTION
FOR E N L A R G E m

1

Plainriff,
vs.

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and
BWN'DA J . L A W N C E , Husband

1

1
3

1

and Wife

1
1

Defendants.

)

S T A E OF IDAHO

1

County of Kootenai

) ss.
)

I, John W. Mack, after bcing duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say:

1. I make this Affidavit of my own personal knowledge. I am over the age of 1 8 . 1
am knowledgeable of the facts and issues re~ardingthis matter and am competent to
testify to thc facts crzntaincd in rhis afXidavix.Ir is me and correct 'to xhe be% of my

knowledge.

AFFTDAVXT OF JOHN MACK TN SUPPORT OF DEFENDATWS MOTION FOR
ENLAEtGEJMENT

2 In t 992,l purchased 1 5 1 acres in the Southest Q u a e r of Section 22, Towaship

50 North, Range 5 West from Harold and Mrdene Funk. This sale conveyed the

remaining interest of the Funk's original 1969 land purchase to me,
3 This (my) property completely surrounds the 1 acre parcel owned by Ha11 as well

as four other p a r d s owned by various business entities operating radio towers. In order

for Tower Asset to gain vehicular access to their site, they must ingress and eqzess across
my land.

4 When I purchased the prope~tyin 1992, there were two roads that provided

vehicular access to the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 One road enters my property via
Signal Point Road from the west-southwest, across the parcel now owned by rhe
Lawrences. The other road enters my property via Mellick Road from the north.
5 . Even though I have occasionally used the access from Signal Point Road, my

preference has always been to use the road from Nellick. Because of my preference to
use the Mellick aceess road, last summer I made significant improvements which
included widening and graveling.
6. 1 have read the affidavit of Harold Funk and I take issue with his statement in

paragraph 4 in which Mr. Funk states that Mellick Road did not provide access to his
property in Section 21 and 22. That statement is simply not correct. The 1969 Funk land
purchase included Government Lot 3 in section 15, Government Lot 4 in sedion 22, and
land lying in the southwest quarter of Section 22. These parcels are contiguous and
Melli~kRoad extended inro the parcel owned by Harold Funk in Section I5 and
connected directly ro the other access road.

053
AFFlDAVlT OF JOHN MACK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR
ENLARGEMENT

7 1 have also read the fidavit

t-tfJohn

R m k and I take similar issues with Mk

Rook statements that the access road to Signal Point Road was the only road that

-

provided access to the property in Section 22 His datement is just not correct for the
same reasons 1 speciFled above

DATED this 30th day of May, 2007.

W, Mack

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to behre me this 3 0th day of May, 2007

"

Residing at

Carn,~i~ission
expires

AFFTDAVIT OF JOHN MACK
ENLARGEMENT

--YQ@J

SUPPORT OF DEFENDAMS MOTION FOR

CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on

the

day of Nay, 2007, 1 caused ta be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed ta the following:

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law

1875 N. Lakewaod Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, 10 8381 4
U S. Mail, postage prepaid

'la:

-kcsimile:

(LORl 6641 684

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
2 13 N. 4'hStreet
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Tele,: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
iSB# 6083

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER SUB ASSET IMC., a Delaware
Corporation,
CASE NO,CV-03-04621
Plaintiff,
MOTION FOR ENMRCEMENT
HEARING DATE: June 13, 2007
TIME:

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

Defendants.

,

3:00 p.m.

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

1

CONES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by

and through their counsel o f record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this
court, pursuant t o Rules 6(b) and 56(c) and 56(f) of the Idaho Rules o f Civil
Procedure, for an extension o f time in which to file their opposition in response
to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendants request t o file their
response on or after August 15, 2007. The affidavits o f John P. Whelan, Doug
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT

-1

Lawrence and John Mack are offered in support af this motion. Defendant's
request oral argument.
This motion js made on the grounds that Defendant's have not had the

opportunity to discover the whereabouts of the various witnesses whose
affidavits are relied upon by Plaintiff. Defendants intend to depose each and
every witness who has filed an affidavit for Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff has
failed to identify what documents it relies upon in seeking i t s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Consequently, Defendant's counsel has had to review
thousands of pages of the files pertaining ta this matter in an effort to
determine what issues must be addressed in the opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment. Lastly, no notice was given by Plainaiff's counsel that she
intended to renew her Motion for Summary Judgment

DATED this

.

50

day of May, 2007.
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

jUheian
A orn

MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT

-2

for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of May, 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of t h e foregoing by the m e t h o d indicated below,
and addressed to the following;
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Via:

-

JFacrirniie:

(208) 664-1 684

JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C.

2 1 3 N , 4Ih Street
Coeur d'Alcne, ID 83 81 4
Teie.: ( 2 0 8 ) 664-5891
Fax- (208)664-2240
ISB# 608 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIClAL DISTRIm OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET INC., a Delaware
cofporation,

CASE NO. CV-03-462 1

Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS

LAWRENCE

VS.

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA

HEARING DATE; June 1 3 , 2007

J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

3:00 p.m.
JUDGE: John 1.Mirchell
TIME:

Defe ndanrs.

STATE OF IDAHO
)

County of Kootenai

ss.

)

I, Douglas P. Lawrence, after being duly sworn ulpon my oath, depose and

say:
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 1

1 . I make this Affidavit of my own personal knowledge. I am over the age of
18. 1 am knowledgeable of the facts and issues regarding this matter and am
competent to testify t o the facts contained in this affidavit. It i s true and correct
to the best of my knowledge.
2. In July 1996, my wife and I entered into a sale agreement to purchase 80

acres in the Southeast Quarter of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West
from Arrnan and Mary Jane Farmanian. We have owned this parcel of land for
over 10 years now and have been in litigation over the use of our private road
for nearly 9 years. I have studied the history of this road thoroughly and can
speak with some authority on the matter.

3. In October of 1998, 1 called Harold Funk on the telephone. 1 called him to
clarify my understanding of the language that was contained in the Sales
Agreement between the Funks and Human Synergistics; the same language the
Plaintiff Capstar claims was a reservation of an easement. In a follow-up letter
that Harold Funk mailed to me in November 1998, Mr. Funk reassured me that
the language was not a reservation. But rather, it was merely to except, from
title, an easement that was previously granted t o GTE.

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 2

3.t: &TIficHb6,

4. In March of 2004, Mr. Funk gave the plaintiff Tower an affidavit, which

the plaintiff now relies on to support a motion of summary judgment, in which
Mr. Funk makes a direct contradiction to the signed writing [ have from him,
Contrary to his writing to me, Mr. Funk now claims in his affidavit that the
language in the sale agreement amounts to a reservation. In light of Mr. Funk
contradictions, I believe the Court should impeach any testimony coming from
Mr. Funk.

5. Also in his affidavit, Mr. Funk claims that Nellick Road did not provide
access to the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 or the Southeast quarter of
Section 21. This statement is just false. My wife and I have, on several occasions
dating as early as 1996, driven our vehicle all the way from our property in
Section 2 1 to Mellick road.

6. Also in his affidavit, Mr. Funk claims that had he not reserved an
easement across the now Lawrence parcel, that his land in Section 22 would
have been landlocked. Mr. Funk knows this statement to be false as well. In
order for Mr. Funk to have a legal easement to his land in Section 22 (through
the now Lawrence parcel), the Funks would have need an easement across the
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 3
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Northeast Quarter of Section 2 8 . The Funks never obtained a legal access across
parcel that precedes the Lawrence parcel travelling from Signal Point Road and
therefore his land i s Section 22 was landlocked irrespective of the Lawrence
parcel. The Funks as grantors could never convey a legal access from Signal
Point road because they never obtained a legal access.
7. Also in his affidavit, paragraph 9, Mr. Funk states: "At rhe rime of the sale
in 1976 to Rassmussen and Chamberlain, access to the parcel was by use o f rhe

same private road that had been continuously used since we first purchased the
property." I take issue to this statement on this point. In an affidavit Harold Funk
gave to the Kootenai Electric Cooperative in February 2001 , he states "We
(Harold & Marlene) resided in Kootenai County, /daho from 1967 unrilH a r d d
Funk moved in the fall o f 1975 and Marlene Funk moved in 1976 after we sold

our house."Clearly, if Mr. Funk moved to American Falls in 1975, he wasn't
continuously using the access road across the Lawrence parcel. I think its save to
say that Mr. Funk's use of the access road probably did not extend beyond
1 975. If he did use it past 1 975, the use was infrequent at best. Certainly, it was

not continuous as he would have this Court believe.
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 4

06')

8. Access t o my propefly, i s controlled by three gales. The first gate i s

located at the end of the county maintained poeion of Signal Point road, The
gate was erected in December 1995 and has been locked continuously since that
time. Another gate is located on Wilber Mead's property and was locked from

1966 through 1998. In 1998 Wilber Mead removed the lock at which time I
placed a lock on my gate. My gate has been continuously locked since 1998.
9. In 1997 1 entered into a License Agreement with Mextel Corporation, the

predecessor in interest to Tower Asset. Through this License Agreement, Nextel
and their successors pay me a monthly rental fee to ingresslegress across my
land to get to their tower sire. They have continued to pay me this rental fee
since the License began in 1997.
10. Sometime aaFt.er1998, 1 met with Clear Channel Management (Capstar).
They informed me that they no longer operate any equipment from their site on
Blossom Mountain, but rather rent out the tower facility to other tenants.
11. Sometime after my meeting with Clear Channel, I did enter into a
License agreement with one of Clear Channel's tenants, Great Northern

Broadcasting. This license agreement was similar to the Nextel Agreement in
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 5

063

that they paid me for access across my road. Great Nonhern Broadcasting
honored this agreement until sometime around the time Capstar filed suit
against us; at which time Capstar was able ro get a Temporary Restraining Order

against us and we had to give them a key to our gate.

DATED this 30th day of May, 2007.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me rhis 30th day of May, 2007

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 6

DLAGLAS

P. A N D BRENDAJ. L A W R E N C E
PO %x 1027
Coctuf d'&ana,

ill 83816-1027

phone (208) 663-2030

amas1 lrmOO*dl&

own

Mr. Haald F&
865 Ptllmore
Arrierican Fads, Idaha 8321 1

-

Reference: Blossom Nounbin SF section 21
Dear Harold:

I want to rhsnk you far taking the time Im week in helping mc undersmd the language contained in the
Sdes Agreement b e h e n you and Human SynsrgisdO. It is somewhat ambiguous and your help is vcry
much appreciated.

I have anached a copy of tile Sales Agrccmenr for your r d e w and recollecrion. Unfortunately, the
reproductjon quality is not very p o d and ir's lard to read. So to help thc marttr. 1 have f e w the
paracaph in qwstian (I& coiumrc) and have typed the explanation as I u n d e m d i t to be (right
calm).

Subject to and including an ingress c g W e~semcilt
,-.
over \iLis M U adjoining property in saia satlons 2 A
and 22 awned by thc grantor

and in~1udmgan ina s m e n l over +-.
portions af Section 21 heretofore granted to the
grantor. %us! wrnen'b shall be over existing roads
until such umc as all record awncfs shall agree-to
rhc relocation, improvment andlor abandoment of
atS or my portions of any roads. This easement is
also over simflar lands in S d s n 2 5.
I have reviewed this document and a-m e
with rhc ~ l ~ c ~ i ~ n .

In October 2966,Pike Reynolds sold a 1 acre parcel ro
GTE in IhesW Scation 22. Pike deeded ro GTE an
easemerit for ingresdegrea across the SE Sectctjon 2 1
and che SW section 22 of which this property became
subject to.

In Nwcmber 1972, Harold Funk purchawd an
ingrcssiegress cascrnent from Wilber Mead across the
SW section 21 for rhe benefit of the lands awned by
.&mld Funk in Secuons 21,22, and 15. Ths
easement is to nin with the existing roads until all

Mr. Harold Funk

Mr. Funk, 81 have the mr=cct udm~lruldingof this language, would you please sign and return this
document to me at your earliest convenience. Also, pleas fffil frec to add any tl~oughtsyou feel
applicable. Thank you saAmuchfor yaw help in this -mr. A copy has been included for your.recards.

/'

'

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of May, 2007, 1 caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following*

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law

1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200

Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4

5. Nail, postage prepaid
(2081 664-1 684

1 "(

Joh P,

helan

SIJSAN P. W E K S
JAMES. VERNON & mEIKS, P.A.
1875 N,L&etvoo$ Dr., Ste. 200
CLeur d'istlene, TD 83 8 14
Telephone: (258) 667-0585
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
ISB $4255
Attorneys for Plsntiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DTSTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, n\T AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAX

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA f .
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

Case No. CV 03-4621

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS
LAWWNCE FILED 5/30/07
NOTICE OF HEAJUNG:
J u ~ ~ 1 3 . 2 0 0 7 p3AL
Time: 3:00 p.m.
Judge: John T. Mitchell

CONES NOW Plaintiff and pursuant to Rule 56 (e) and Rule 7 (b)(3)(B), Idaho Rules of

Civil Procedui-e, hereby moves to strike portj.onsof the amdavit of Douglas Lamence for the
reasons enumerated herein. Regarding affidavits submitted in support of sumrnaq judgment.
Posey v. Fclrd Motor Credit Co., 111 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005) discussed the requirement

thad evidencc submitted by affidavit must be ad.missihle to be considered by the court. Tilerein
the court noted:

MOTION TO STRIKE: 1

Pasey argues that nearly the entire asdavit i s inadmissible because it does not
show &3t the matters averred to are based on personal knowledge, contams
coacl usory asscrtions, contains indmissibl e hearsay m d provides no foundation
for il-ttroduction of attachcd exhibits, Posey's positioa 1s well taken.
Affidavits sx~pportingor oppos~nga su~nmaryjudgment motion must be made on
personal krrowledge, must set: forth such facts as would be admissible jut evidence,
and must show affirmatively that the a s a n t is competent to testify to the m a ~ e r s
stated. Jdaho Rule o f Civil Procedure 56(e). These requirements "are not satisfied
by an d5davi.l:that is conciusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by
persond knowledge." (Cites omitted.)
The Posey v. FordMotor Credit Co. coud hither noted:

Eight docmcnts are attacl~edto tlie affidavit. No fotundation is provided
concerning who prepared the documents, several of which, on their face, indicate
that they were not prepared by Ford but by the Caldwell dealership. The
purports to identify the docummts without demonstratiou of the requisite personal
knowledge for autltentication of the docurnettis pursuant to I.R.E. 901 and
includes arguments as to the documents' legal effect, none of which is admissible.
(Cite omitted.) To the extent that the documents are of'fered to show the truth of
assertions contained within them,the documents are hearsay for whicl-1no hearsay
rule exception has been established by the Griath affidavit. In Stare 11, IJill, 140
Idaho 625,97 P.3d 1014 (Ct.App. 2004). we described the foundational
requiremenls for application of I.R.E. 803(6), the exception to the hcassay rule for
busiiless records:
Rule 803(6), the business record exception to tlie hearsay
rule, allows admission of a record or report if it was made
and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity and if it was the regular practice of that business to
make the report or record. See Hcnder.son v. Smifh, 128
I&ho 444,450, 91 5 P.2d 6, 12 (1 996); In the Interesc of
S. W ,127 Idaho 5 13,529,903 P.2d 102,109 (Ct.App.
1995). These foundational requirements must be shown
through "tl~e
testimony of the custodian or other qualified
wihless." I.R.E. S03C6). That is, the record must be
authenticated by someone "who has custody of the record
as a regular part of hts or her work or wlto has supervision
of its creation." Henderson, 128 Idaho at 450, 91 5 P.2d at
12. A document is not admissiblc under I.R.E. 803(6)
unless the person testifjzlng has a persol~alknowledge of
the record-keeping system used by the business vvhjcl~
created the document. Id.; Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Tdaho
293,297,900 P.2d 291.205 (Ct.App. 1995).

MOTION TO STRIKE: 2

Hill, 140 Jdaho at 628, 97 P.3d at 1017. The mere reccipt a.nd
retentjon by a business entity o f a document that was created
elsewkere docs not transfo'onn tlne document into a btlsiness record
of the receiving e n ~ t yfor purposes d1.R.E. X03(6). Id.; Tn
the l ~ t e r e s otf S K . I27 Xd&o 57 3,520, 903 P.2d 102, 109
(Ct.iZpp. 1995). Friffith's fidavit does not comply with the
requiremen~sof Rule 803(6) with respect to any of the records
attached to his affidavit.

Tbe following portions of Mr. Idawrcnce's affidavit should be stricken:
1.

Paragraph 3 of Mr. Lrzwrence's afidavit contains inadmissible hearsay and should

2.

Paragraph 6 presents argum,ent,and slsould be stricken.

3.

Paragrap11 7 presents = v e n t and should be stricken.

4.

Paragraph 8 contains inadmissible hearsay and sh0~11.dbe striclcen.

DATED this 6' day of June, 2007.
.TAMES. VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

BY:
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Attorneys for PI aintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERmGE
I hereby certify that on the fiTH day of June. 2007, T caused to be sewed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

U.S. Mail

Hand Delivered

John P. Wilelan
213 4thStreet
Coeur dl Alene, ID S3 8 16

'4
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Overnight Mail

d

Telecopy (FAX)

SUSAhTP. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P A.
1175 N.Lakcwood Dr., Ste. 200
Goeur d'Alme, ID 3 38 14
Teleghotle: (205) 667-0685
Facsimile: (205) 664- 1684
TSB ifc1255
Aflomeys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE. FIRST NDIGTAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, I 3 AhKl FOR THE?COUNTY OF KOOTEKAT

TOWER ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware
corporation,

Case No. CV 03-462 1

Plaintiff;

1

VS.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE. husband and wife,

REPLY m M O W Y D U N IN SUPPORT
OF Rl2NEWlEI) MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1I
I

Defendants.
Defendant has submitted the -davit

I
of Douglas L m e n c e , apparentiy in opposition of

the motion. Much of the affidavit i s inadmissible. S0rn.e of it presents argument. To the extent

this affidavit presents argument, it is addressed herein.
Mr. Lawrence apparently requests that this court not give credence to Harold Funk's

amdavit because of a letter that Defendants o'otail~edfrom Mr. Funk in 1998 wherein he
indicated 16s understanding of the terms included in the Sales Agreem.ent. M-1:. Lawrence claims

WPLY MEMORANDUM IP4 SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT: 1

071
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rbat this lettcr, prepmed by him, is so diametrically opposed to E m l d Funk's affidavit that the

shouid not ,tonsjdgr Warold Funk's ttestirnony as credsble. TIIC ""clarification" portion

followed a phone conversation between Mr. FLII~C
and Mr. T,awrence, and without all of the
mnomdi)~gcixumstan6;es of that conversation, it is impossible to understad w11a;t iVr. Funk

was clarifying for Mr. Lawrence with respect to rhc: language. Mr. Lawrence has l m o ~ wbow
~ to
cantact kfr. Funk since 1998. (Jn fact, plaintiffs counsel was able to locate Mr. Funk based
upon t l ~ caddress provided by this letter.) If l ~ wisl-ted
e
to have testimony regarding this isstlcs,
he could easily have contacted Mr. Funk. The letter he provides is hearsay, and does not provide
impeachcat of Mr. Funk's affidavit testimony. Further, Mr. Funk's affidavittestimony is
corroborated by Mr.Rook7saffidavit testimony.
Next, TvIr. Lawrence argues that previous affidavits of Funk submitted in unnamed cases
are inconsistent. However, even if one were to believe the unsupported allegations, tlie affidavtts
art: not inconsistent. Mr. Funk indicated he sold the property in 1976 and that the same p ~ i v e

road that had been contjnuously used from when they purchased the property was the one in use

at that time. In the "other" alleged affidavit, Mr. Funk testified that his family moved to Idaho

Falls in 1975-1976. Lawrence argues that if Mr. Funk movcd from 1:11e area in 1975, his use of
the road the last year had to be infrequent at best. This argument misconstrues the affidavit
testimony. Mr. Funk did not testify that he used the road contii~uouslyonly in 1976. He said the
road that was the access was the one he had continuously used since he iirst the property, i.e. the
only road he used, and it: was on an ongoing basis. Lawa-tce confuses "continuous" with
"frfreqrtent.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RET\;EWEB MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT: 2
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Defenda~tshave submi"rted no material fact in dispte. Summary judment i s

appropriate.
D M E D this &I'

day of &w 2007.
JJWES, VERNON & M E K S , P.A.

BY:
Attorneys for Plslinliff

C E R m I C A m OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the hth
day of&-

2007, I caused to be served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

E
'l

U.S. Mail

El

O v e n ~ g lNail
~t

II3

Hand Delivered

W

TeJ ecopy (FAX)

John P. WeIan
2 13 4'"treet
Coeur d'hlene, JD 83816

REPLY MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SLWMARY
JUDGMENT: 3
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JOHN Pa WHELAN, P.C.
2 1 3 N. 4thSrreet
Coeur dlAlene, 10 83111 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: ( 2 0 8 ) 664-2240
lSB# 6083
IN THE 81STRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAt40, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware
Corporaxion,
CASE NO. CV-03-04621

Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN

HEARING DATE: June 13, 2007
TIME:

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

1

)

)

County of Kootenai

3:00p.m.

ss.

1

I , John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
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1 am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda

1.
Lawrence,

I have personal knowledge of the following facts and

could

competently testify,

2.

This affidavit i s offered in support of the Motion for Disqualification

for Cause seeking to disqualify the Honorable John T. Mitchell from presiding
any further in the above-entitled action, and also in support of Defendant;sZ
application for an order shortening time.

3.

When the Honorable John T, Mlrchell took the bench in 2001, your

affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in the case of Yovichin v.

Bush, CV-2001-2116 (2001). Judge Mitchell took over the role as presiding
Judge in that case for the Honorable James Judd when Judge Judd retired. Your
affiant believes that Judge Mitchell disqualified himself, pursuant to Rule
40(d)(4), in that case on November 20, 2001 because your affiant was the
attorney of record for the Defendants and Judge Mitchell was biased or prejudice
against John P. Whelan at that time, as the parties to the action and the counsel
Tor the Plaintiffs uerty Trunkenholz) had had no prior dealings with Judge
Mitchell before he was assigned to the case. Your affiant believes that Judge
Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case because he had a "personality
conflict" with your affiant that biased or prejudiced Judge Mitchell in his
handling of that case. A copy of the order for disqualification i s attached h e r e t o
as Exhibit A.

4.

In the case of Sau/s v. Luchi (CV-04-1616),

counsel for the Defendant.
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - Z

your affiant was the

The matter was tried a s a jury trial.

The jury

rendered a defense verdict in that chase which the Honorable John T. Mitchell
overturned in part. The portion of the verdict overturned required your affiant's
client to pay over an earnest money deposit to the Plaintiffs even though their
pleadings made no such request. Your affiant believes that the Court's action
was motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant as the attorney for the
Defendant in the action. The Defendant filed his own appeal in that action, the
status of which is unknown.

5.

In the case of Straub v. Smith, CV-04-5437

(Supreme Court No.

31955), your affiant was the attorney for the Defendants.

In that case, the

Plaintiff dismissed her action one week before a scheduled jury trial.

The

attorney for the Plaintiff, Scott Poorman, sought and received your affiant's
stipulation to have the case dismissed. Your affiant reached no agreement with
Mr. Poorman to waive costs and attorney fees. Yet, the order submitted to the
Honorable John T, Mitchell by Mr. Poorman contained wording that the parties
were to bear their own costs. The proposed order was not sent to your affiant
before being submitted to the Court for signing. The Court signed the order as
submitted. When the order was served on your affiant after it had been signed,
your affiant filed a timely motion for reconsideration. The Honorable John T.
Mitchell did not apparently read the motion.

The motion was denied.

The

grounds for denial included the failure to cite a rule o f procedure in support of
the motion (yet such a rule was referenced in the motion). The claim for costs
and attorney fees was denied on the additional ground that the Defendants'
pleading did not contain a request for attorney fees (which 1.R.C.P Rule 54(e)(4)
specifically states is not necessary). This ground for denial of the motion For
reconsideration was not even asserted by Mr. Poorman in his opposition papers
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
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to the motion. The C o u r ~supplied Mr. Poorman wirh his argument.

Attorney

fees and cosrs wpre denied to your affiant and his clients even though the Court

admonished Mr. Poorman for perpetrating a fraud on the Court. An appeal was
filed by your affiant for the Defendants and the Court of Appeal overturned the
trial coun's ruling on the matter. The Idaho Supreme Court took the case on
review but no decision has been issued on the review. Your affiant believes that

the Court's ruling in the Straub v. Smith case was motivated by the Coun's bias
and prejudice against your affiant.

6.

In the case of Capsrar v. Lawrence, CV-02-7671 (Supreme Court

NO.

32090), the Honorable John T. Mitchell granted summary judgment in favor of
the Plaintiff, who was Susan Seeks, the partner of Lee James, a friend o f the
Honorable John T. Mitchell and the current president of the ldaho Trial Lawyers
Association.

In this case, the Court found that a certain Sale Agreement

pertaining t o the sale of land was clear and unambiguous, An appeal was taken

by the Defendants. The ldaho Supreme Court overturned the grant o f summary
judgment.

Your affiant believes rhar the result on the appeal has merely

increased the bias and prejudice of the Court against your affiant.

7.

In the case of T~kverAsset Sub, inc, v. Lawrence, CV-03-462 1

(Supreme Court No. 320921, on the same set of documents found t o be clear

and unambiguous in the Capsrar case, the Court found the documents
ambiguous. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in that
action. Your affiant believes that the granting of summary judgment in favor of
the Plaintiff (who was represented by Ms. Weeks) was motivated by bias and
prejudice against your affiant. An appeal was taken to the ldaho Supreme Court
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. W H E U N
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and the Court's order was overturned. Your affiant believes that the results of

the appeal in the. case has only inrreasPd the Court's bias and prejudice againsr
your affiant.

8.

In the recent cases of Krivor v. Rogers (CV-06-6252) and

Metrapolifan Propefly B Casualty v. M e n (GV-06-6 3 5 8), where your affiant

represents the Rogers and the Allens, Defendants in the artians, the Honorable
John T. Mitchell has seemingly made it clear that the Coun will not enterrain
argument from your affiant unless the argument i s supported by cases directly
on point.

Your affiant believes the Court has singled out your affiant for

treatment thar i s different from the treatment received by other attorneys
appearing before rhe Honorable John T. Mitchell.

9.

Your affiant believes that the bias and prejudice held by the Court

against your affiant results in a situation where your affiant's clients do not
receive fair and impartial rulings by the

Coun, Your affiant believes that the

bias and prejudice held by the Court against your affiant causes the Court to be
biased and prejudiced against the clients of your affiant.

10.

Your affiant requests that the Honorable John T. Mitchell disqualify

himself from further rulings an the above-entitled matter.

11.

Good cause for the granting of Defendants' application for an order

shortening time exists in that the date of June 13, 2007 has already been
reserved for the hearing of several motions.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 5

DATED r hi s

ay of June, 2007.

JOHN P, WHELAN, P.C.

Subscribed and sworn before me this

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
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day of June, 2007.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

ay af J u n e , 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true a n d correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicared below,
and addressed ta the fallowingi

Susan P, Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N, Lakewood Drive
Suite 200

Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:

U S , Mall, postage prepaid

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

1% 'THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE I;IRST JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF TliE

STATE OF IDAHO 1% AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IiOOTENAl

MAKK DANIEL Y OVICHIN,

1
1

vs.

1
I

ORDER OF SELF
DISQUALIFICATION

)

1

ROBERT BUSH,

1

-

The undersigned having dcrermined rhar i~ is appropriate

to

volunrvily disqualify himself

IT IS OFtDERED rhar the undersigned is hereby disqualified and this marrer is referred ro

rhc administrative judge for re-assrgmtnr. .
Dated this

2 d .ft-

dny of November, 2001.

CERTIFICATE OF M~.@Nc

2/

I hvruby ccnify (hut aa rPc
day af No~ember,2001 n rrvr md conic\ copy
forcgoitlg w:ts n i ~ i l c d postngc
,
prepaid, or smtr by ihtcfofficc nlntl or f3crimilc to:
Hon Charles l,losi.~ck

ORDER OF Set-F OlSQUALlFlCATlON

a

Ex

-

iiblt

ol ihc

JOHN P. WHEMN, P,C,
2 1 3 N. 4thStreet
Coeur dlAlene, 10 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
l5B# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DlSTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1
Plaintiff,
APPLICATION FOR ORDER
SHORTENING TIME

VS.

HEARING DATE: june 13, 2007

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
j. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

TINE:

3:00 p.m.

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell
Defendants.

I

COMES NOW, the attorney for the above-named Defendants, John P.
Whelan, and respectfully moves the Court for an order that the time required for
service o f the Motion for Disqualification for Cause be shortened so that this
matter can be heard on the 13th day of June, 2007, at 3:00 o'clock p,m., before
the Honorable John T. Mitchell.

APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TINE - 'I

This Motian is made for the reasan and upon the g r o u n d s thar there i s n o t
sufficient rime t o give statutory notice. Plaintiff will n o t be disadvantaged in any

Farhian, and further,

it would

be in the interest of justice.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that John P. Vdhelan will present oral argument and

evidence at this hearing.

DATED this g L b acrf.JUne,
y 2007
Respectfully Su bmltted,

doh*.

hgc&y

APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME
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Whelan
f o r Defendants

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5'bay

at.June. 2007, 1 caused to

be

served a true and correct copy of rhe foregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following.

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon (SI Weeks
Artorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewoad D r ~ v e

Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, 10 8381 4

Via.

U,S, Mail, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
21 3 N. 4thStreet
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax; (208) 664-2240
ISf3#$6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COdlNlY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER SUB ASSET INC,, a Delaware
Corporation,
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1

Plainriff,
NOTION FOR
vs,

DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE

DOUGLAS P, LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J, LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

HEARING DATE: June 13, 2007

Defendants.

TIME:

1

3:00 p.m.

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by
and through their attorney of record, John P. whelan, and hereby motions this
court for an Order for Disqualification for Cause against the Honorable John T,
Mitchell, presiding judge in the above-enritled action. This morion is made an
the ground that Defendants believe the Honorable John T. Mitchell is biased or

MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE - 1

prejudiced against t h e m or t h e ~ rcase in this action. Thrs motion Is made on the
ground of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure R u l e 40(6)(2).

Defendants request oral argument.
DATED this &day

of June, 2007.
Respectfu Ily Submitted,

~bhn\p.Whelan
for Defendants

MOTION FOR DlSQUALIFICATlON FOR CAUSE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on rhe
ay of June, 2007, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of rhe faregoing by the methad indicated below,

and addressed to the following:

Susan P, Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks

Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

d Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

STATE ii." !Cglif;
60UkT ;ST icC<rEh&
RLE?

SUSAN I?. WEEKS
S A m S , V E m O N (4;t, WEEKS, P.A,
1875 N. Lkevvood Dr.: Ste. 200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Telephone: (208) 467-0685
Facsimile. (208) 664-1684

ISB JIC.4255

Plttorneys for Plaintiff

TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FTRST JXJDICIAL DISTRICT OF ?3IE

STATE OF 1 1 3 ~ ~IN
0 ,AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAX

TOWER ASSET SUB mC.,a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

Case No. CV 03-4621

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
OF MFIDAVTT OF JOHN MACK
FILED 513 0107
NOTICE OF HEARING:
June 13,2007
T h e : 3:00p.m.

Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff and pursuant to Rule 56 (e) and Rule 7 (b)(3)(B), Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, hereby moves to strike portions of the dfidavit of John Mack for the reasons
enumerated herein. Regarding affidavits submitted in support of summary judgment, Posey v.
Ford Motor Credit Co., 111 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005) discussed the requirement rhat

evidence submitted by affidavit must be admissible to be considered by the court. Therein the

court noted:

hfCYI'ION TO STRIKE: 1
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Poscy u p c s that nearly the entire &davit is inabissible because Ir does not
show that the matters avierrcd to arc based on personal hotvledge. contains
conclusary assertions, contins inadtnisfible hearsay aiid provides no foundat~on
for introduction of a~achedexhibits. Poscy's position is well taltel~.
AEdavits supporting or opposing a summatyjudgment motion must be made on
personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissibIe ill evidenceand rnrtst show affirmatively that the afiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56Ce). These requirements "are not satisfied
by an a f i h v i t that is conclusory, based on heaxsay. and not supported by
personal knowledge." (Cites omitted.)
The Pose y

I>.

Ford ltlotor Credit Co. court further noted:

Eight documents arc attached to thc affidavit. No fotu~dationis provided
concerning who prepared the documents, several o f which, on their facc, indicate
that they wcrc not prepared by Ford bul by the Caldwell dealership. The affidavit
purports to identify the documents witl~outdemonstrat~onof the rcquisitc personal
knowledge for authentication of the doc~mentspursuant to T.R.E.901 and
includcs a r v c n t s as to the documcnts' legal ckct. none of which is admissible.
(Cite omitted.) To thc cxtcnt that the documents ate offered to show the truth of
assertions contained within them. the documcnts arc hearsay for whiclt no l-iearsay
rule excep&onltas been estabIished by the Griffitb affidavit. In Stare \L IJi'dl, 140
Idaho 625-97 P.3d 1 014 (Ct. App. 2004). we dcscribcd the foundational
requirements for application of I.R.E. 803(6), the exception to the hearsay rule for
business records:
Rule 803(6), the business record exception to tlic hearsay
rule, allows admission of a record or report if it was made
and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity and if it was the regular practice of that business to
makc the report or record. See Henderson v. S'mirh, 128
Idaho 444,450, 9 2 5 P.2d 6, 12 (1 996); In !he Interest of
S.W., 127Idaho 513, 520,903P.2dfQ2.109(Ct.App.
1995). These foundational requirements must be shown
through "the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness." 1,R.E. 803(6). That is, the record must be
authenticated by someone "wlzo lzas custody of the record
as a regular part of his or her work or who has supesvisioxl
of its creation." Hendersolz, 128 Idaho at 450, 9 15 P.2d at
12. A document is not admissible undcr I.R.E. 803(6)
unless the person testifyxng has a personal knowledge of
the record-keeping system used by thc business which
created the document. Id.; Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho
293,297,900 P.2d 201,205 (Ct.App. 1995).
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Hill, f 40 Idaho at 628,97 P.3d at 1 O 1 7. TI1c mere receipt and
rdention by a business entlty of a document that was created
elsewhere does not trmsform the docm~entinto a busmess record
sf the receiving entity for p ~ ~ ~ oofs X.R,E,
e s 803(6)*Id.; In
rhc Interest of5 TV, 127 Idaho 513, 520. 903 P.2d 102, 109
(Ct.Apg. 1995). C r i f f i t h ' s affidavit does nnl comply with the
req~tirementsof Rule 803(6) wit11 respect to any OFthe records
attacl~edto his affidavit.
Posey al: 483-484

Mr. Mack indicates in his fidavit 'c11athe 1% owned lnis property since 1992 and has
used and improved a private access road f-rom the termination of Mellick Road into the Section
22 property he owns, which surrounds the Plaintiffs property. Mr. Mack claims that he 'Yalces

issue" with Harold Funk's aEidavit testilnoiiy because in 11669 Mellick Road extended to
property owned by Mr. Funk in Section 15. Mi. Mack postulates, without foundation or
evidence to support his supposition that Mr. Funk's property connectcd the private access road
that he ilow uses to access his property in Section 22. Therefore, that portion of Sohn Mack's
testimony should be stricken and not considered for the motion for enlargement. F~~rther,
if it

was Defendants' intent to present this evidence as raising a question of fact in opposition to t l ~ e
motion for summary judgment, it should be stricken and 11ot coltsidercd.

DATED this 7thday of June, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON 2% WEEKS, P.A..

BY:
Attorneys for PI ainli:ff
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1I ~ r e b ycertify that a n tlie 7T'' day of . l m ~ r 2007.
.
I caused to be served a true and co12-ect
copy of the foregaillg dacumrnt by thc method i~~dicatcd
bciow, and addressed to thc following:
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Hand Delivered
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Telecopy (FAX)

J o b P. Whelm
213 4'" Street
Coeus d'iilene, US 838 16
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JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
2 1 3 N. 4" h~treet
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 4

Tefe.: (208) 664-5891
Fax;

(208) 664-2240
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
CASE NO. CV-03-04621

Plaintiff,
ORDER SHORTENING TINE

DOUGLAS PALAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

Defendants.

BASED upon the Motion for Disquallfication for Cause and Application for
Order Shortening Time filed herein and for good cause appearing, now,
therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that John P. Whelan's Motion for Disqualification
for Cause

Application for Order Shortening Time shall be heard on the 13th

day of June, 2007 at 3:00 p.m.

ORDER SHORTENING TIME

-1

DATED this

-

*b.
i .-day

ORDER SHORTENING TIME

-2

of June, 2007.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of June, 2007,I caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed as indicated below:
John P. Whelan
2 1 3 N. 4'h Street
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Fax to (208) 664-2240

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1 875 N.

Lakewood Drlve

Suite 200

Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

X

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:

'EOF IDAHO
County of KOOTENAi
;
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl
)

TOWER ASSET, INC., a Delaware
Corporation

1
)

case NO.

CV 2003 4621

1
Plaintifs ,

1
)
)

VS.

1
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
1
)
Defendants.
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE,
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)

case NO.

Plaintiffs,
I
I

1

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
1

CV 2002 7671

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE,
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)

1
Defendants.

1

I. BACKGROUND.
A. Tower Asset, Inc. v. Lawrence.
On June 27, 2003, plaintiff Tower Asset, Inc. filed this lawsuit against defendants
Lawrence, requesting an easement across defendants Lawrences' land so that Tower
Asset could service antennas on land it leased on top of Blossom Mountain. Tower Asset
requested a temporary restraining order which was granted on June 24, 2003, ordering
Lawrences not to block Tower Asset's access across Blossom Mountain Road,
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cont~ngenton Tower Asset posting a $3,000.00 bond. Douglas Lawrence filed a pro se
appearance on December 5 2003, and Brenda Lawrence filed a pro se appearance on
December 18,2003.
On August 17, 2004, Tower Asset filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. On
September 9, 2004, attorney John P. Whelan appeared as counsel for the Lawrences.
Oral argument on the summary judgment motion was held November 9, 2004. At the
conclusion of that hearing the Court granted Tower Asset's motion and ordered Tower
Asset's counsel to prepare an order. Tower Asset did not prepare a proposed order for
quite some time, but on May 27, 2005, this Court entered an "Order Granting Motion for
Summary Judgment and Entering Decree of Quiet Title." On July 7, 2005, Lawrences
timely filed a Notice of Appeal. On January 26, 2007, the ldaho Supreme Court filed its
decision vacating summary judgment and remanding the matter back to this Court. On
April 18, 2007, the Remittitur from the ldaho Supreme Court was filed in this case. Two
days later, on April 20, 2007, this Court noticed this matter for a status conference to be
held on May 14, 2007. Counsel for both sides appeared, and at the conclusion of that
hearing, this matter was set for a four day jury trial commencing December 10, 2007.
That jury trial was given a first priority setting relative to the Capstar case. Also on May
14, 2007 Tower Asset filed its "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", and this was
discussed at the May 14, 2007, status conference. At that May 14, 2007, hearing, Tower
Asset requested a hearing date for their motion for summary judgment and was given the
date of June 13, 2007.
On June 5, 2007, John P. Whelan, attorney for defendants Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence, filed a "Motion for Disqualification for Cause", an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan"
in support of said motion, and a Notice of Hearing on said motion for June 13, 2007.
Since such hearing date did not give plaintiff the required fourteen-day notice (I.R.C.P.
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7(b)(3)(A)) , an Applicat~onfor Order Shortening Time was filed. At the June 13, 2007
hearing, the motion to shorten time was granted.

B. CapsfarRadio Operafing Company v. Lawrence.
On November 7, 2002, plaintiff Capstar Radio Operating Company filed this
lawsuit against defendants Lawrence, requesting an easement across defendants
Lawrences' land so that Capstar could access the land it owns on top of Blossom
Mountain, upon which it has a transmission tower. Capstar requested a temporary
restraining order which was granted on November 7, 2002, ordering Lawrences not to
block Capstar's access across Blossom Mountain Road, contingent on Capstar posting a
$1,000.00 bond. A hearing was held on November 15 2002, on the preliminary
injunction, and Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence appeared pro se. The
preliminary injunction order was entered on November 21, 2002. On December 2, 2002,
attorney Ian Smith appeared on behalf of Lawrences. On August 26, 2003, Smith filed
his motion to withdraw which was rendered moot by the substitution of attorney Sam
Eisemann filed on September 5, 2003. Even though he is not an attorney, on November
3, 2003, Douglas Lawrence filed a Notice of Substitution of Counsel for both himself and
Brenda Lawrence. On December 5,2003, Douglas Lawrence filed a notice appearance
that he is appearing on behalf of himself only. At a hearing December 11, 2003, Douglas
Lawrence appeared, as did Brenda Lawrence. The Court cautioned the Lawrences of the
hazards of appearing without counsel, that they would be held to the same standard as
an attorney, that Douglas Lawrence could not represent Brenda Lawrence, and required
Brenda Lawrence file a written pro se appearance if she was going to represent herself.
Mediation was ordered to be completed no later than February 28, 2004. Brenda
Lawrence filed her appearance on December 18, 2003.
On March 9, 2004, Capstar filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and noticed
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that rnot~onfor hearing on April 6, 2004, and on March 31, 2004, Capstar noticed that
rnot~onfor hear~ngon April 14. 2004. Lawrences appeared pro se at the April 14, 2004
hearlng Part~alsummary judgment was granted in favor of Capstar against Lawrences
on Capstar's express easement theory, and the Court specifically stated Capstar's other
theories were not to be considered until Lawrences completed their discovery. On April
16 2004, Capstar filed its Motion for Order of Entry of Final Judgment on the grounds

that since the Court had found an express easement, the other theories were moot. On
April 22, 2004, the Lawrences pro se filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
Partial Summary Judgment of April 14, 2004, and noticed that matter for hearing on April
29, 2004. Capstar noticed its Motion for Entry of Final Judgment on April 29, 2004, as
well. At the conclusion of that hearing, this Court granted Capstar's Motion for Entry of
Final Judgment, denied Lawrences' Motion for Reconsideration, and counsel for Capstar
was ordered to prepare an order reflecting those rulings. Capstar's counsel failed to do
so, The case was inactive for quite some time, and as a result, the Court filed a Notice of
Proposed Dismissal on January 24, 2005. On February 10, 2005, attorney John P.
Whelan appeared for the Lawrences. An Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment
and Entering Decree of Quiet Title was finally prepared by Capstar's counsel and was
signed and entered by the Court on June 7, 2005. On July 7 2005, on behalf of the
Lawrences, Whelan filed a Notice of Appeal.
On January 26, 2007, the ldaho Supreme Court filed its decision vacating
summary judgment and remanding the matter back to this Court. On March 30, 2007, the
Remittitur from the ldaho Supreme Court was filed in this case. On April 20, 2007, this
Court noticed this matter for a status conference to be held on May 14, 2007. Counsel for
both sides appeared, and at the conclusion of that hearing this matter was set for a fourday court trial commencing December 10, 2007, set with a second priority to the Tbwer
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Asset case Also on May 14, 2007, Tower Asset filed its "Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment' and this was discussed at the May 14, 2007, status conference. At that May
14 2007 hear~ng,Tower Asset requested a hearing date for their motion for summary
judgment and was given the date of June 13, 2007.
On June 5, 2007, John P. Whelan, attorney for defendants Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence, filed a "Motion for Disqualification for Cause", an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan"
In support of said motion, and a Notice of Hearing on said motion for June 13, 2007.
Since such hearing date did not give plaintiff the required fourteen-day notice (I.R.C.P.
7(b)(3)(A)), an Application for Order Shortening Time was filed. At the June 13, 2007
hearing, the motion to shorten time was granted.
II. ANALYSIS.
A. Introduction.
The filing of Lawrences' Motion for Disqualification for Cause has the effect of preempting the June 13, 2007, hearing on Tower Asset's Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment. That is because "Upon the filing of a motion for disqualification, the presiding
judge shall be without authority to act further in such action except to grant or deny such
motion for disqualification." I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5).
ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(2) requires the "...judge.. .sought to be
disqualified shall grant or deny the motion for disqualification upon notice and hearing in
the manner prescribed by these rules for motions." Hearing was held on June 13, 2007.
This Court appreciates the fact that this is a matter committed to the Court's discretion.
Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 ldaho 27, 29-30, 813 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Ct.App. 1991);
Roselle v. Heirs and Devisees ofArchie Grover, 117 ldaho 530, 533, 789 P.2d 526, 529

B. Allegations of Bias and Prejudice Based Upon Past Decisions.

The basis of Whelan's motion is stated in paragraph nine of his affidavit:

9. Your affiant believes that the bias and prejudice held by the Court
against your affiant results in a situation where your affiant's clients do not
receive fair and impartial rulings by the Court. Your affiant believes that the
bias and prejudice held by the Court against your affiant causes the Court
to be biased and prejudiced against the clients of your affiant.
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 5,

9. A review of Whelan's affidavit shows he has made

specific allegations of "bias and prejudice" by this Court against Whelan, and those
concerns must be addressed.
From a temporal standpoint, Mr. Whelan's first concern is stated as follows:
3. When the Honorable John T. Mitchell took the bench in 2001,
your affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in the case of
Yovichin v. Bush, CV-2001-2116 (2001). Judge Mitchell took over the role
as presiding judge in that case for the Honorable James Judd when Judge
Judd retired. Your affiant believes that judge Mitchell disqualified himself,
pursuant to Rule 40(d)(4), in that case on November 20, 2001 because your
affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendants and judge Mitchell was
biased or prejudice [sic] against John P. Whelan at that time, as the parties
to the action and the counsel for the Plaintiffs (Jerry Trunkenholz [sic]) had
had no prior dealings with judge Mitchell before he was assigned to the
case. Your affiant believes that judge Mitchell voluntarily disqualified
himself in the case because he had a "personality conflict" with your affiant
that biased or prejudiced judge Mitchell in his handling of that case. A copy
of the order for disqualification is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
This Court has reviewed Exhibit A, the Order on Self Disqualification in Yovichin v. Bush.
From a review of that document, the Court has absolutely no independent recollection as
to why the Court voluntarily disqualified himself from Yovichin v. Bush, Kootenai County
Case No. CV 2001 21 16. The Order on Self Disqualification was entered November 20,
2001, which was the first day of work for the undersigned as a district judge. The court
file in Yovichin has been purged. The Court has reviewed what was scanned into court
records in that case. Following that review, the Court cannot determine the reason for the
disqualification and can only speculate as to two possible reasons.
First, in Yovichin, John Beutler and Associates, Inc., and Rafael (Rusty) Reyes
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were eventually brought in as third party defendants by defendant Bush. However, from a
revlew of the l~mitedcourt records it appears that this did not occur until after November
20, 2001 The undersigned would consider Mr. Reyes and Mr. Beutler as friends and

would likely not have felt comfortable being assigned to a case where they were parties or
potentla! witnesses. Since the scanned file is incomplete, it is not clear is whether the
Court's review of the file on November 20, 2001, would have disclosed that John Beutler
or Rusty Reyes were involved in the case.
The second and more likely reason the undersigned disqualified himself in
Yovichin is as follows: As an attorney, the undersigned can recall being involved in only

one lawsuit where Mr. Whelan was the opposing attorney. That case was In the Matter of
the Estate of Dianne Rothe, Kootenai County Case No. SP 675. That case involved a

probate filed by Mr. Whelan on behalf of his client Alvin V. "Butch" Rothe. A review of the
court file in that case shows that at the time the undersigned was transitioning from an
attorney to a judge, he was still counsel for the ldaho Trial Lawyer's Association, which
had been named as a recipient of a foundation named after the decedent's predeceased
husband, to be funded from a medical malpractice claim that allegedly resulted in his
death. The undersigned became involved in that case on March 22, 2000, and remained
involved until just before his investiture as a district judge. On November 16, 2001, four
days before becoming district judge, the undersigned signed a Notice of Substitution of
Counsel where Leander L. James was substituted as counsel for the ldaho Trial Lawyer's
Association. Since In the Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rothe was still pending at the
time of the undersigned's appointment as a district judge, the undersigned would have
disqualified himself from Yovichin as a matter of course. Upon inheriting Judge Judd's
caseload on November 20, 2001, the undersigned disqualified himself from those case*
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ass~ynedto Judge Judd in which cwnsel on those cases were the opposing counsel in
cases in which the undersigned was involved as an adversarial opponent at the time of
the undersigned's appointment. Self disqualifications in those cases were made to avoid
any appearance of bias since just prior to November 21,2001, the undersigned and one
of the counsel in those cases assigned to the undersigned judge were in an adversarial
relationship. Those self-disqualifications were only made to cases in which counsel were
involved who were opposing adversarial counsel in other cases that were still pending
which the undersigned was an attorney at the time he became district judge. Those selfdisqualifications were made in several cases in an effort to avoid the appearance of
impropriety that would occur when one day the undersigned was your adversarial
opponent in a litigated case, and the next day he was assigned to be the judge in another
one of your cases. The passage of time ameliorated that concern.
Again, since the undersigned has no independent recollection as to why he
disqualified himself in Yovichin, all of the above amounts to conjecture. Mr. Whelan has
not stated any reason why he feels this Court would have had a "personality conflict" with
Mr. Whelan back on November 21, 2001, so this Court can only speculate. The only
reason this Court engages in such speculation is because Mr. Whelan has raised
concerns and those concerns must be addressed. The undersigned cannot recall why he
disqualified himself in Yovichin v. Bush. In spite of the Court's best efforts to determine
the reason for the 2001 disqualification in Yovichin v. Bush, the fact that the Court cannot
recall the reason itself indicates a lack of bias or prejudice. Had bias or prejudice or a
"personality conflict" been the reason for that disqualification in 2001, the Court would
expect to remember that. It does not.
The undersigned can unequivocally state that he harbors no grudges against Mr.
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Whelan at the present, nor did he on Novernber 21, 2001. The undersigned can

unequivocally state that he has no bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan at present, nor
did he on November 21,2001
If the reason for that self-disqualification in Yovichin v. Bush was due to the still

pencJing probate or trust litigation, the passage of time eliminates the need to selfdisqualify or disqualify for cause due to past adversarial relationships. Within the
passage of a year, the undersigned did not disqualify himself from new cases assigned to
him, in which counsel were involved which were involved in litigation still pending at the
time he became a district judge. That fact is borne out by the fact that apparently the next
time a case in which Mr. Whelan was involved was assigned to the undersigned was in
2004 in Sauls v. Luchi, Kootenai County Case No. CV 2004 1616. That case was filed
March 8, 2004, twenty eight months after the undersigned was appointed as a district
judge, and at least twenty-eight months distant from any prior dealings with Mr. Whelan
as an adversary. Accordingly, there was no self-disqualification in Sauls v. Luchi.
Mr. Whelan's next concern is as follows:
4. In the case of Sauls v. Luchi (CV-04-1616), your affiant was the counsel
for the Defendant. The matter was tried as a jury trial. The jury rendered a
defense verdict in that chase [sic] which the Honorable John T. Mitchell
overturned in part. The portion of the verdict overturned required your
affiant's client to pay over an earnest money deposit to the Plaintiffs even
though their pleadings made no such request. Your affiant believes that the
Court's action was motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant as the
attorney for the Defendant in the action. The Defendant filed his own
appeal in that action, the status of which is unknown.
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, pp. 2-3,

4. This Court's action in that case was simply not

in any way "motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant as the attorney for the
Defendant in the action." Mr. Whelan is correct; Mr. Luchi filed his own appeal. A review
of the Court file in Sauls v. Luchi, which is entirely intact, would have shown Mr. Whelan

that on November 8, 2006, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the undersigned in all
respects in 2006 unpublished Opinion No. 715. That decision became final upon April

"i3
2007, with the filing of the Remittitur in that case. In any event, the decisions made by
the Court in Sauls v. Luchi were not made based upon bias or prejudice against Mr
Whelan. They were decisions based upon motions made by opposing counsel Charles
Dean. The Court has reviewed its June 17,2005 "Memorandum Decision and Order on
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict" in Sauls v. Luchi. It is well
reasoned. While Luchi filed his own appeal, if Mr. Whelan felt the judge was biased or
prejudiced, or off base in its decision, or misunderstood the matter before it, there are
mechanisms short of appeal Mr. Whelan could have used to bring that error to the Court's
attention. That did not occur. In any contested motion, usually one side wins, one side
loses. Sometimes one party wins in part and loses in part. Just because one side wins
does not mean the judge's decision was based upon bias or prejudice against the party
who lost or their attorney. The undersigned knows such was not the case in Sauls v.
Luchi.
Next, Mr. Whelan writes in his affidavit;
5. In the case of Straub v. Smith, CV-04-5437 (Supreme Court No.
31955), your affiant was the attorney for the Defendants. In that case, the
Plaintiff dismissed her action one week before a scheduled jury trial. The
attorney for the Plaintiff, Scott Poorman, sought and received your affiant's
stipulation to have the case dismissed. Your affiant reached no agreement
with Mr. Poorman to waive costs and attorney fees. Yet, the order
submitted to the Honorable John T. Mitchell by Mr. Poorman contained
wording that the parties were to bear their own costs. The proposed order
was not sent to your affiant before being submitted to the Court for signing.
The Court signed the order as submitted. When the order was served on
your affiant after it had been signed, your affiant filed a timely motion for
reconsideration. The Honorable John T. Mitchell did not apparently read
the motion. The motion was denied. The grounds for denial included the
failure to cite a rule of procedure in support of the motion (yet such a rule
was referenced in the motion). The claim for costs and attorney fees was
denied on the additional ground that the Defendants' pleading did not
contain a request for attorney fees (which 1.R.C.P Rule 54(e)(4) specifically
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states IS not necessary). This ground for denial of the motion for
reconsideration was not even assefied by Mr. Poorrnan in his opposition
papers to the motion. The Court supplied Mr. Poorman with his argument.
Attorney fees and costs were denied to your affiant and his clients even
though the Court admonished Mr. Poorman for perpetrating a fraud on the
Court. An appeal was filed by your affiant for the Defendants and the Court
of Appeal overturned the trial court's ruling on the matter. The ldaho
Supreme Court took the case on review but no decision has been issued on
the review. Your afiant believes that the Court's ruling in the Straub v.
Smith case was motivated by the Court's bias and prejudice against your
affiant.

Affidavit of John P. Whelan, pp. 3-4,

5. The rulings against Mr. Whelan's client in

Straub v. Smith were simply not motivated in any way by bias or prejudice on behalf of
this Court. The Court has reviewed the intact Court file in Straub v. Smith and is
convinced of that fact. Mr. Whelan's affidavit raises several issues. Since Straub v.

Smith is still under consideration by the ldaho Supreme Court, it would be inappropriate
for this Court to comment on the merits of anything that occurred in that case.
Mr. Whelan claims: "The Honorable John T. Mitchell did not apparently read the
motion [to reconsider]." Id. A review of the court file in Straub v. Smith shows that a
hearing was held on May 10, 2005, on Smith's (Mr. Whelan's client) Motion to
Reconsider. At that hearing, a review of the court minutes show that not only did this
Court indicate on the record that it had reviewed the Motion to Consider, but articulated
the grounds Mr. Whelan set forth in that motion. The Court mentioned Jones v. Berezay,
120 ldaho 332, 815 P.2d 1072 (1991) as a case on point, a case neither attorney in

Straub cited to the Court. So not only did the Court read Mr. Whelan's motion to
reconsider, since Mr. Whelan's motion contained no citations to any legal authority, the
Court conducted its own research.
The bottom line is that in Straub v. Smith, Mr. Whelan did what he should have
done if he andlor his client disagreed with this Court's rulings. ..they filed a request for
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reconsideration and then an appeal.

A request for reconsideration is exactly what the Lawrences did in Capstar v.
Lawrence, CV 2002 7671, and an appeal is exactly what Mr. Whelan and his clients have
done in Capstar and Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 462 1. An appeal is
the appropriate action to take if you believe a judge has committed error, made a mistake,
or misunderstood the facts or the law. The rulings made against Mr. Whelan's client in

Capstar and Tower Asset were not in any way made or motivated by bias or prejudice
against Mr. Whelan by this Court. In fact, this Court's ruling in the Capstar case was
made before Mr. Whelan even appeared in that case. The ruling was made in Capstar
while the Lawrences were proceeding pro se. For the same reasons set forth above in

Straub v. Smith, it would be inappropriate for this Court to discuss the merits of these two
cases.
Mr. Whelan claims bias or prejudice on behalf of the Court because counsel for
plaintiffs in Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence,
CV 2003 4621 "...Susan Seeks [sic], the partner of Lee James, a friend of the Honorable
John T. Mitchell and the current president of the ldaho Trial Lawyers Association."
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 4,

6. It is true that plaintiffs' counsel in Capstar and

7*0werAsset, Susan Weeks, is in the same law firm as Lee James. However, the
undersigned has no knowledge as to whether they are partners or what their professional
relationship is. It is true that Lee James is president of the ldaho Trial Lawyers
Association, but the undersigned was unaware of that fact until the undersigned read Mr
Whelan's affidavit and confirmed the fact by viewing the ITLA website. Mr. Whelan has
not made clear what Mr. James being president of ITLA has to do with anything. The
undersigned was a member of the ITLA five and one half years ago, but is not a member
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now that he is a district judge. The undersigned was the attorney of record for I T M in the
case In the Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rathe, but the undersigned received no

financial remuneration for all time spent on that case. That matter was handled pro bono
during the undersigned's involvement. In the general sense of the word, the undersigned
is a "friend'of Lee James, but has not seen Lee James in other than a professional
setting in more than fourteen months. The last time the undersigned saw Lee James
socially was at a fund raising event for ICARE, a child abuse prevention agency. Lee
James may have appeared in court before the undersigned in the past fourteen months
as an attorney in a hearing, but the undersigned has no recollection of that one way or
another. The Court is confident it has not spoken to Lee James or seen Lee James
socially since the ICARE fund raising event. Along with Peter Erbland, Lee James helped
organize a fund raising event for the undersigned in his re-election, but that occurred
about fifteen months ago. The fund raising event was held at Mr. Erbland's law firm and
other than that fact, the undersigned is not aware of what efforts Mr. James expended on
that fund raising event.
Mr. Whelan then makes the claim that:
8. In the recent cases of Krivor v. Rogers (CV-06-6252) and
Metropolitan Property & Casualty v. Allen (CV-06-6358), where your affiant
represents the Rogers and the Allens, Defendants in the actions, the
Honorable John T. Mitchell has seemingly made it clear that the Court will
not entertain argument from your affiant unless the argument is supported
by cases directly on point. Your affiant believes the Court has singled out
your affiant for treatment that is different from the treatment received by
other attorneys appearing before the Honorable John T. Mitchell.
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 5,

85. The claim that "the Honorable John T. Mitchell

has seemingly made it clear that the Court will not entertain argument from your affiant
unless the argument is supported by cases directly on point", without more, is a difficult
claim in which to form a response. Since those are pending cases, it is improper to
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respond to the merits of any legal arguments raised in those cases by Mr. Whelan. First
of all, it should go without saying that argument supported by cases directly on point will
be more persuasive than an argument lacking that support. Second, the allegation by Mr.
Whelan that "...the Honorable John T. Mitchell has seemingly made it clear that the Court
will not entertain argument from your affiant unless the argument is supported by cases
directly on point" lacks specificity as to any particular ruling made at a particular hearing.
A review of the court minutes on all hearings held in Krivor and Metropolitan show that at
no time was Mr. Whelan not allowed to present argument, nor was he cut off on any
argument, nor was he told that without cases on point his arguments would not be
entertained. In Krivor Mr. Whelan did not attend the January 30, 2007 hearing; Mr.
Whelan did not attend the February 20, 2007, hearing; Mr. Whelan attended the April 26,
2007, hearing and argued without interruption; Mr. Whelan did not attend the May 23,
2007, hearing. In Metropolitan: Mr. Whelan did not appear at the December 19, 2006
scheduling conference, he had on November 8,2006 faxed the Court in chambers a copy
of a Notice of Appearance, but no filing fee was paid so the pleading was not filed;
Mr.Whelan attended the March 22, 2007 hearing and argued without interruption; Mr.
Whelan attended the April 24, 2007 hearing and argued without interruption. If the Court
in Krivor and Metropolitan failed to entertain an argument by Mr. Whelan, one would
expect a motion for reconsideration. A review of the court files in Krivor v. Rogers (CV06-6252) and Metropolitan Property & Casualty v. Allen (CV-06-6358) reveals no motions
for reconsideration filed by Mr. Whelan on behalf of his clients therein.
A review of the court files in the following cases show no motion for disqualification

for cause (I.R.C. P . 40(d)(2)) has ever been filed: Krivor v. Rogers (CV-06-6252),
Metropolitan Property & Casualty v. Allen (CV-06-6358), Straub v. Smith, (CV-04-5437),
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S a ~ ~vl sL U C ~(CV-04-1616).
I
Whlle that fact has little, if anylhing, to do with this Court
not belng biased or prejudiced against Mr. Whelan, if Mr. Whelan's feeling that this Court
was b~asedor prejudiced against him goes back to November 21, 2001, one would have
expected a motion for disqualification to have been made in one of these cases at an
earlier time. On November 15, 2006, a motion to disqualify without cause (I.R.C.P.
40(d)(l)) was made by Mr. Whelan on behalf of his client in Krivor v. Rogers, and that
motion was granted on November 16, 2006. Following objection from opposing counsel
as to the issue of service, that order was rescinded by an order dated November 20,
2006. If there were concerns as to bias or prejudice of this Court, a motion for
disqualification for cause would certainly have been anticipated in that case at that time.
Decisions from the ldaho Supreme Court were issued on January 26, 2007, in

Tower Asset Sub Inc., v. Lawrence and Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence.
Mr. Whelan states that regarding those two cases an appeal was taken by the
defendants, that the ldaho Supreme Court overturned the grant of summary judgment,
then notes "Your affiant believes that the result on the appeal has merely increased the
bias and prejudice of the Court against your affiant." Affidavit of John P. Whelan, pp 4-5,

r[r[ 6, 7. The Court has read the decisions in both cases and finds them to be well written.
As noted by the ldaho Supreme Court, this Court committed error, and the ldaho
Supreme Court reversed that error. Those appellate decisions are the "law of the case" in
these two cases. This Court is human. It is quite a different thing to argue that because
this Court committed error, which the ldaho Supreme Court corrected, that this Court
would then hold against Mr. Whelan the fact he prevailed on behalf of his clients on those
appeals. Quite the contrary. Mr. Whelan is to be commended for bringing those appeals
and having the ldaho Supreme Court correct the mistake. He did the right thing. "The
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results of the appeal" (Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 5, r[ 7), create no bias or prejudice
-- -
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aga~nstMr. Whelan whatsoever

The Idaho Court of Appeals held in Desfosses v.

Desfssses, 120 ldaho 27, 30, 813 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct.App. 1991), "A disqualifying
prejud~cecannot be deduced from adverse rulings by a judge, whether they are right or
wrong." Citing 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges 5 221 (1969). Adverse rulings alone do not support
the existence of a disqualifying prejudice. Bell v. Bell, 122 ldaho 520, 835 P.2d 1331
(Ct.App. 1992). "Merely because a judge has participated in prior legal proceedings
involving related parties or issues does not provide grounds for the judge to recuse
himself." Roselle v. Heirs and Devisees o f Archie Grover, 117 ldaho 530, 534, 789 P.2d
526, 530 (Ct.App. 1990).
At oral argument on June 13, 2007, Mr. Whelan mentioned that in Capstarthe
Court found the language in the deed to be unambiguous, and the language in the same
deed to be ambiguous in TowerAsset. Certainly that was a mistake by this Court, and
that mistake was pointed out by the ldaho Supreme Court in TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v.
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 5, n. 2 (January 26, 2006). However, that mistake by
this Court does not indicate bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan. To the extent the
mistake needs to be explained to address any concerns of Mr. Whelan, it is explained as
follows: On April 14, 2004, this Court heard argument on plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment in Capstar, and Lawrences' argument was presented by Douglas Lawrence, pro
se. In granting summary judgment, the Court found the language of the deed and sales
agreement unambiguous. The Lawrences pro se made a motion to reconsider in Capstar,
and at hearing on that motion on April 29, 2004, this Court again stated the deed was
unambiguous. The Tower Asset motion for summary judgment was heard seven months
laferon November 9, 2004, and argument was presented by Mr. Whelan. While the
finding of ambiguitylunambiguity is inconsistent, the Court was faced with two different

arguments by two different people, one a lawyer and one not, on two difierent days seven

months apart. The ambiguouslunambiguous nature of the deed and sales agreement
was not the basis for the reversal in these cases by the ldaho Supreme Court. The ldaho

Supreme Court found that neither the deed nor the sales agreement created an express
easement. TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, pp. 6-7 (January
26, 2006); Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 4
(January 26, 2006). Thus, even if there were some logic to the argument that the Court
was biased or prejudiced because the Court found the documents ambiguous in the case
Mr. Whelan argued and unambiguous in the case Douglas Lawrence argued seven
months earlier, that specific ruling was not relevant. What is relevant as far as any bias or
prejudice by the Court is the fact that in both cases, one argued pro se by Douglas
Lawrence and one argued by Mr. Whelan, the result was the same. There is no
differential treatment by this Court as between Mr. Whelan or Douglas Lawrence.
At oral argument on June 13, 2007, Mr. Whelan mentioned several issues he had
not mentioned in his "Motion for Disqualification for Cause" or his "Affidavit of John P.
Whelan". First, Mr. Whelan mentioned that he had won jury trials and court trials before
the undersigned. At oral argument Mr. Whelan stated he had "...a string of motions that
had not been granted by the Court." Not every attorney wins every motion, and not every
attorney wins half of the motions they bring or defend. Mr.Whelanls affidavit mentions
Sauls v. Luchi (one motion), Straub v. Smith (one motion and a motion to reconsider that
motion) and now Capstar v. Lawrence (one motion but as previously mentioned, Mr.
Whelan was not counsel for Lawrences when Capstarwas decided) and TowerAsset
Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence (one motion). Even if it were proper to base a claim of bias or
prejudice upon past adverse rulings (Desfosses and Bell show it is not proper), four

rnot~onsis hardly a sign~ficantlylarge statistical sample upon which to base a clairn of bias
or prejudice resting upon prior decisions rendered. And if keeping score were proper (it is
not), one would think you would weigh those motions against the court trials Mr. Whelan
indicated he had won which were assigned to this Court.
At oral argument Mr. Whelan for the first time raised the case of Whelan v. Mills, a
fee dispute between Mr. Whelan and a client that was assigned to this Court, as another
example of how this Court exhibited bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan. Mr. Whelan
did not have a case number, but the Court researched the matter and reviewed the court
file in Kootenai County Case No. CV 2003 3582. In Whelan v. Mills Mr. Whelan in his
complaint alleged the Mills owed him $1 1,903.74. In their answer the Mills claimed Mr.
Whelan owed the Mills $4,085.00 for work they had done for Mr. Whelan. After a May
24, 2004, court trial before the undersigned, this Court found the Mills owed Mr. Whelan
$6,453.89. Part of the reason Mr. Whelan was found to not be entitled to all he was
claiming was he had unilaterally raised his hourly rate from $125.00 to $1 50.00 per hour.
The remaining reason Mr. Whelan was found to not be entitled to all he claimed was
Greg Mills was entitled a credit for work he had performed on Mr. Whelan's land.
However, instead of the $4.085.00 credit the Mills were seeking, the Court found them
only entitled to $1,290.00. It is difficult to see how this Court's ruling in that case amounts
to bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan.
Finally, while the following argument has not been made by Mr Whelan, it needs to
be addressed. It could be argued that simply because Mr. Whelan has made this motion
to disqualify, and his affidavit contains many allegations of bias and prejudice against the
undersigned, such allegations of bias or prejudice alone would now render the Court
biased and prejudiced. There have been other motions to disqualify the undersigned for
cause in the past, and there will be similar motions in the future. While such motions are
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infrequent, the unders~gnedis duty bound to take the claims very seriously. The
undersigned has given careful attention to the claims of bias and prejudice and can
assure the parties and their attorneys, especially Mr. Whelan, that no bias or prejudice is
present merely because this motion has been made. Mr. Whelan has concerns. Mr.
Whelan is commended for bringing those concerns to the Court's attention. It is
unfortunate that Mr. Whelan did not raise these concerns earlier as he has apparently
harbored them for at least a couple of years since Sauls v.luchi was decided. But Mr.
Whelan has come forth and raised his concerns at this time in this motion to disqualify for
cause in this case. He has that right. Indeed, if he is sincere in those concerns, and
there is no reason to believe he is not sincere in those beliefs, then he has a duty to
consult with his client, and if his client consents, to raise those concerns with the Court.
The filing of this motion to disqualify for cause does not in any way result in bias or
prejudice by the Court. The Court is neither insulted nor inconvenienced in any way by
the filing of the motion. Mr. Whelan has concerns and the Court must address those
concerns. The reason for the length of this written opinion is to address those concerns.
The affidavit of Mr. Whelan uses terms such as: "Your affiant believes that Judge
Mitchell disqualified himself.. . because.. .Judge Mitchell was biased or prejudice [sic]
against John P. Whelan at that time" (Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 2, 7 3); "Your
affiant believes that judge Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case because he
had a 'personality conflict' with your affiant ..." (Id.); "Your affiant believes that the Court's
action was motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant.. ." (Id. p. 3, 74); "The
Honorable John T. Mitchell did not apparently read the motion" (Id. p. 3, 7 5); "Your
affiant believes that the Court's ruling in the Staub v. Smith case was motivated by the
Court's bias and prejudice against your affiant" (Id. p. 4, 7 5); and "Your affiant believes

the Court has s~ngledout your af-fiant for treatment that is different from the treatment
received by other attorneys appearing before the Honorable John T. Mitchell" Id. p. 5, 7 8.
As stated by the ldaho Court of Appeals upholding a denial of a motion for disqualification
for cause by a judge: "Suspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, conjecture,
innuendo, and statements of mere conclusions.. . may not be substituted for a statement
of facts." Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 ldaho 27, 30, 813 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct.App. 1991),

citing Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287, 295 (1952). While Mr. Whelan's
concerns are not "facts", making this motion to disqualify for cause is about the only way
he could air these concerns he has. Mr. Whelan's concerns are unfounded. That is not
to say Mr. Whelan is not sincere when he says he has those feelings. But it is to say that
this Court simply does not harbor the bias and prejudice alleged by Mr. Whelan. The
undersigned is not biased or prejudiced against Mr. Whelan or against his present clients
in this case, or his past clients in past cases.

C. Campaign Contributions by Opposing Counsel's Firm.
Mr. Whelan raised the issue of campaign contributions for the first time at oral
argument on June 13, 2007. Mr. Whelan made an offer of proof that the firm of which
Susan Weeks is a partner contributed $1,000 to the undersigned's re-election fund in the
spring of 2006, according to the Sunshine Disclosure filed with the State of ldaho
Secretary of State. At oral argument, Mr. Whelan also mentioned that attorney Scott
Poorman, the attorney opposing Mr. Whelan in Straub v. Smith, supra, donated to the
undersigned's re-election fund in the spring of 2006. The problem with the argument
regarding Mr. Poorman is that the last action taken by this Court in Sfraub v. Smith
occurred on May 10, 2005 (a year before the election and Mr. Poorman's contribution),
when this Court signed the Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration.
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There cannot even be the appearance of a quid pro quo when the predicate contribution
has not even yet occurred.
As to the contribution to the undersigned's re-election fund by Ms. Week's firm,

there was no evidence that Ms. Weeks made the contribution or that she consented to
the contribution, or even that there is a partnership. If the Court were to assume that she
consented and that her firm is a partnership, there still is no basis for the Court to
disqualify himself.
First of all, had the offer of proof not been made by Mr. Whelan at the hearing on
June 13, 2007, the undersigned would still to this day be ignorant of what is contained in
the Sunshine Report regarding Ms. Weeks' law firm. The Court disclosed on the record
at the June 13, 2007, hearing the fact that it had not reviewed the Sunshine Report, but
assumed it was accurate as the Court trusts his campaign treasurer who filed the report.
The reason the Court has not reviewed the financial disclosure report is the Court must
abide by the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct. Cannon 5(C)(2) states in part: "Except as
required by law, a candidate's judicial election committee should not disclose the names
of contributors to judicial campaigns and judicial candidates and judges should avoid
obtaining the names of contributors to the judicial campaign." Since the Court was at all
times ignorant of this financial contribution, the Court could not and was not biased or
prejudiced in favor of Ms. Weeks. Likewise, the Court was not biased or prejudiced
against Mr. Whelan as a result of a contribution made by Ms. Weeks' firm, of which it
was, up to June 13, 2007, ignorant.
Now the Court has been made aware of that fact by Mr. Whelan, the Court must
now make two determinations. First, does the knowledge of Ms. Weeks' firm's
contribution result in any bias or prejudice in her favor? Second, is this now a
A

"proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned", which
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includes but 1s not l ~ m ~ t etod instances "where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party or a party's lawyer " Cannon 3(E)(l)(a). Campaign contributions of
which a judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or other who appear before the judge,
may be relevant to disqualification." Comment to Cannon 5(C)(2).
This Court can honestly say that the contribution by Ms. Weeks' firm in no way
results in any bias or prejudice in her favor. There are several reasons for this. First,
there is more than one attorney in Ms. Weeks' firm. The firm's phone book ad lists three
attorneys. It is unknown who made the decision to contribute. Second is the amount of
the contribution. A candidate's committee may only solicit and accept reasonable
contributions from lawyers. Cannon 5(C)(2). One thousand dollars is a reasonable
amount from a firm of lawyers. According to Mr. Whelan's own offer of proof, other firms
donated similar amounts or more. Third, since the undersigned was ignorant of the
contribution until Mr. Whelan's offer of proof, obviously no one within the firm expected or
asked for any preferential treatment as a result of the contribution.
No cases were cited by Mr. Whelan on this issue at the June 13, 2007 hearing.
Since the issue was raised by Mr. Whelan for the first time at hearing, Ms. Weeks cited
no cases. Campaign contributions cannot serve as independent grounds for recusal.
Degarmo v. State, 922 S.W.2d 256, 267 (Tex.App. 1996), citing River Road
Neighborhood Association v. South Texas Sports, Inc. 673 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Tex.App.
1984). In that case, the judge was found not to have abused his discretion when he
accepted a $500 campaign contribution from a murder victim's family. Id. In Rocha v.
Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.App. 1983), the Court of Appeals of Texas unanimously
held that one of its members should not be disqualified even though two of the justices
had received "...many thousands of dollars from or though the Law Office of Pat

Maloney, P C (attorney for the appellees)". Id. In River Road Neighborhood Associat~on
673 $3 W 2d 952 (Tex App 1984). ~twas held that two justices on the Texas Court of

s
reported campaign contr~butions,and
Appeals, one who had received 21.7% of h ~ total
another justice who had received 17.1% of his total reported campaign contributions from
South Texas Sports, a party to the litigation, were not disqualified because neither of the
"

challenged Justices may gain or lose anything of a pecuniary or personal nature

because of any judgment that might be rendered in this case." The $1 000 contribution
from Ms. Weeks' firm is significantly less than 17.1% of all amounts contributed to the
undersigned's campaign, as the undersigned himself spent $12,000.00 of his own funds
on such campaign, and the undersigned is aware that over $50,000 was spent on the
campaign (thus assumes about $38,000 was raised from other people). There is no
contention made, nor is there any way possible the undersigned could gain or lose from
any future rulings in either the Capstar or the Tower Asset case.
In MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store and MackKenzie v. Breakstone, 565
So.2d 1332 (Fla. 1990), the Supreme Court of Florida held that an allegation in a motion
for disqualification "...that a litigant or counsel for a litigant has made a legal campaign
contribution to the campaign of the trial judge, or the political campaign of the trial judge
or the trial judge's spouse (two consolidated cases on appeal) without more, is not a
legally sufficient ground" for disqualification. 565 So.2d at 1334. The Florida Supreme
Court noted: "As with other campaigns, judicial campaigns require funds." 565 So.2d at
1335. "Judicial campaigns and the resultant contributions to those campaigns, therefore
are necessary components to our judicial system." Id. The Florida Supreme Court noted
that ". . .the United States Supreme Court has raised two concerns raised by contributions
to campaigns for public office: 'I. The tendency or possibility to create a quid pro quo
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relationship and, 2. The creation of an appearance of influence or corruption."' Id. The
Florida Supreme Court then held:
However, we find that Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct together with
Florida's statutory limitation upon campaign contributions and the requisite
public disclosure of such contributions, provide adequate safeguards
against the above-entitled concerns regarding contributions to
constitutionally mandated judicial campaigns and render the ground alleged
in the motions at bar legally insufficient when presented as the sole ground
for disqualification.
565 So.2d at 1336. There are thus, three factors. First, the applicable Florida Judicial
Conduct provision was that judicial candidates "should not himself solicit campaign funds,

or solicit attorneys forpublicly stated support, but he may establish committees of
responsible person to secure and manage the expenditure of funds.. ." Id. (emphasis in
original). ldaho has essentially identical language: "A candidate shall not solicit
campaign contributions in person." Canon 5(C)(2). "A candidate may establish
committees of responsible person to conduct campaigns for the candidate through media
advertisements, brochures, mailings, candidate forums and other means not prohibited by
law. Such committees may solicit and accept reasonable campaign contributions,
manage the expenditure of funds ..." Id. Second, the per person campaign contribution
limit in Florida for a district judge in 1990 was $2,000. 565 So.2d at 1336. In ldaho that
amount at present is $1,000. ldaho Code § 67-6610A. Third, Florida statute requires
disclosure by the campaign treasurer of amounts and name address and occupation of
each person who made a contribution over $100. 565 So.2d at 1336. ldaho requires the
same disclosure, but for any amounts over $50. ldaho Code § 67-6610. Thus, Idaho's
statutes are twice as restrictive today as Florida's statutes were 17 years ago.
In addition to the three factors discussed in NlacKenzie, there are two additional
factors that indicate that the campaign contributions are not legally sufficient grounds for
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rec~isalin the instant case. Fourth, the passage of time since the contribution. The
contribution had to have been over a year before Mr. Whelan brought his motion on
behalf of the Lawrences. The fact of the contribution was available for Lawrences and
Mr. Whelan to ascertain through the Secretary of State's website for nearly a year, yet
nothing was mentioned until plaintiffs in the two cases renewed their motion for summary
judgment. Fifth, the undersigned in fact did not know of the contribution by Ms. Weeks'
firm until the June 13, 2007, hearing and heard of such only through Mr. Whelan. It is
hard to have a quid pro quo relationship when one is ignorant of the contribution.
The Florida Supreme Court cited a Nevada Supreme Court case:
In Florida, as in Nevada, "leading members of the state bar play important
and active roles in guiding the public's selection of qualified jurists. Under
these circumstances, it would be highly anomalous if an attorney's prior
participation in a justice's campaign could create a disqualifying interest, an
appearance of impropriety or a violation of due process sufficient to require
the justice's recusal from all cases in which the attorney might be involved."
Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 774 P.2d 1003, 1020 (Nev.
[ I 9891) cert. denied 493 U.S. 958, 110 S.Ct. 376, 107 L.Ed.2d 361 (1989).
565 So.2d at 1337-38. In NlacKenzie, the Florida Supreme Court held that even though
the ground (campaign contributions) was legally insufficient, the motion for disqualification
should have been granted because in ruling on the motion for disqualification, Judge
Mackenzie "went beyond a mere determination of the legal sufficiency of the motion and
passed upon the truth of the facts alleged." 565 So.2d at 1339. This is because Florida
has a rule that prohibits such. The Florida Supreme Court stated: "...our rules clearly
provide, and we have repeatedly held, that a judge who is presented with a motion for his
disqualification 'shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged nor adjudicate the question
of disqualification."' Id. "When a judge has looked beyond the mere legal sufficiency of a
suggestion of prejudice and attempted to refute the charges of partiality, he has then
exceeded the proper scope of his inquiry and on that basis alone established the groun
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for his disqualification." Id. Idaho has no such rule. Obviously Texas has no such rule

as the courts in the above cases discussed the allegations of prejudice. Obviously
Nevada has no such rule as the reasons put forth by the judge who was sought to be
disqualified (Justice Gunderson) were discussed in detail. Ainswon'la v. Combined Ins.

Co. of America, 774 P.2d 1003, 1020-22 (Nev. 1989), cerl: denied493 U.S. 958, 110
S.Ct. 376, 107 L.Ed.2d 361 (1989). This Court finds that a simple denial of the Motion to
Disqualify for Cause, without a discussion, would create an untenable result, in that
neither Mr. Whelan nor his clients would have any idea how the Court treated these
various allegations raised by Mr. Whelan. Should this decision be appealed and the
Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals graft a rule that the judge may only adjudicate
the question of disqualification, so be it. This Court is convinced that since there is no
such rule, the more fair result to all parties and counsel is to discuss the various
allegations.

Ill. ORDER.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that in the exercise of this Court's discretion, for the
reasons set forth above, defendants' Motion for Disqualification for Cause pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2), in Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 is DENIED and defendants'
Motion for Disqualification for Cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) in Tower Asset Sub,
Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621 is DENIED.
Entered this 2!jth day of June, 2007.
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JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C,
2 1 3 N. 4" Street
Ccleur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Tele,: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
vs,
HEARING DATE:

TINE:

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J, LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,
Defendants,

STATE OF IDAHO

1

County of Kootenai

1

JUDGE: John 7,Mitchell

1

> ss.

I, Jahn P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.
Lawrence.

i am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda
I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN

-1

competently testify. This affidavit i s offered in sugporr of Defendants' motion

for reconsideration o f an order of' the Court denying Defendants' motion for
disqualification for cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed on June 25, 2007.

2.

in the course of: making t h e decision on Defendants' motion far

disqualification for cause the Court obviously engaged in indcpendenr fact
finding before reaching a decision on Defendants' motion.

The Court even

reviewed a case that was not identified by this affianx as being relevant to the
motion for disqualification. Additionally, the Court engaged in speculation in
creating an argument for denial of the motion for disqualiPicarion when rhe clear
inference to be drawn from the evidence offeredwas that rhe Court disqualified
itself in the case of Yovjchin V. Bush (CV-2001-21 16) for bias and prejudice
againsr rhis affianr.

3,

The

Court then based the denial of Defendants'

motion .For

disqualification on the Court's independent investigation of the facts and the
speculation as to why the Court disqualified itself in Yovichin v. Bush (CV-2001 -

21 16).

The speculation and independent investigatian by the Court was

improper, thus increasing the appearance of impartiality. Idaho Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 3.
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DATED this

2.

of July. 2007.

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

u

A tarn y for Defendants
Subscribed and sworn before me this

q nb

day of July, 2007.

My Comrn. Expires:
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the qT'

day of July, 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by rhe method indicated below,

and addressed to the following:
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
US. Mail, postage prepaid

Via:

J

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C.
2 1 3 N, 4thSxree~
Coeur dXAlene, ID 8 3 8 1 4
Tele,: (208) 664-5831
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
CASE N O , CV-03-04621

Plainriff,
MOTION FOR

us,

RECONSIDERATION

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

HEAR1NG DATE:
TIME;

JUDGE: John T, Mitchell
Defendants.

I

COME3 NOW, Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J, Lawrence,

by and through their attorney, John P. Whelan, hereby move the Court for
reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion
for Disqualification for Cause, I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2). This Motion i s made pursuant to
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1 l(a). This motion is made on the grounds
that the court should have ruled on t h e motion based on the evidence offered.
MOTION FOR ENtARtEMENT - 1

The Court. should not have conducted i t s own independent investigation of the
facts without the permission of counsel.
This motion is based on the court's files and records in this proceeding
together with any affidavits filed in support of t h i s motion.
Defendants request oral argument

DATED this

.

day of July, 2007.
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

Whelan
y for Defendants

MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 2

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

qT'

day of July, 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,

and addressed to the following:
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks

Attorneys at Law
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, 10 8381 4
Via:

US. Nail, postage prepaid

Facsimile:-(208) 664-1 684

STP,T,cl.T-:)t r[k:fi3
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JOHN P, WHELAN, P.C.

2 1 3 N. 4'" Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Tele,: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (2081 664-2240
IS&-# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER SUE ASSET INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
CASE NO. CV-03-04621
Plaintiff,
NOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL FROM AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

HEARING DATE:
TIME:
JUDGE: John 7. Nitchetl

COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by
and through their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this
court, pursuant to Rules 12(a) and 12(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules for an
Order for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order. Defendants request
an Order granting them permEssion to appeal the Memorandum Decision and

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 1

Order Denying Motion for Disqualification for Cause, 1.R.C.P 40(d)(Z) filed June
25, 2007.
This motion is made an the grounds that good cause was shown for
disqualification. Moreover, the Court engaged in an independent investigation

of the facts and considered evidence gathered independently by the Court and
which was not presented by counsel in reaching the Court's decision to not
disqualify the Court from further proceedings. The independent investigation
also incorporated speculation that was not warranted by the facts.
Defendants request oral argument.

DATED this

7

day of July, 2007.
Respectfully Submitted,

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 2
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HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

9%

day of July, 2007, 1 caused ro be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,

and addressed to the followingz
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law

1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

via:

.7

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
2 1 3 N, 41th Street
Coeur d3AIene, I 0 8381 4

Teie.: (208) 664-5891
(208) 664-2240

Fax:

ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICTCOURT OF THE FIRST JU~ICIALO ~ S T R ~ C T THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C ~ U N T YOF KOOTENAl
I t

1 \;

TOWER SUE ASSET
Corporation,

INC.,a Delaware

l,
I

;

'ASE NO. CV-03-0462 1

\I,

J.

vs .

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. MWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

DATE: August 6,2007

Defendants.

STATE

OF IDAHO

)
)

County of: Kootenai

ss.

1

I, John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn,

1.
Lawrence.

I am the attorney for Defendants,
I have personal knowledge of

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEUN - 7

Lawrence and Brenda

and could

competently testify. This affidavit i s offered in support of Defendants' motion
for reconsideration of an order of the Court d&nying Defendants' motion for

disqualification for cause pursuanr to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed on June 25, 2007.

2.

I,

I

On behalf of the Lawrences I filed/ lla
motion requesting that rhe
1,

Honorable John T. Mitchell disqualify hirnselfl/;or cause due ro bias and/or
prejudice against your affiant. The Court did ridt rule on the motion when the
I

oral argument was presented on June 13, 20~$,
rhe rnarrer was taken under
submission

3.

!I

I

On June 25, 2007, the Court filed

decision denying the motion

for d~squallflcat~on.The decislon was filed on14
after the Court conducted i t s
j/
I

own independent ~nvestigationinto the facts.

n
ihe decision of the Court was
I

in this proceeding, and based

obviously based on matters outside of the
an matters not even referenced by

in the motion or at oral

argument.

j!

,
I

I,

j!

1

Your affiant made no reference to t$e case of the Estare o f Diane
r ,:
Rothe, Case N o SP 00675 (2000). The C O $ ~nevertheless performed an
4.

5

independent review of this care and opined that the rase may have been the
I

reason why the Court voluntarily disqualified i d e l f in the case of Yovichin

1:

\

Bush, a case where your affiant was t h e artorne9,of record for the Defendant in
,I

1;

the action. The Court speculated in its June 25, 2b07
decision that the voluntary
' /
/I

disqualification might have been filed due to

I

11

tktl

li-fi.

Mitchell played in that case before taking the be?
,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
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5.

The fitate ~f Diane R~l"hewas a $robate axtian. "dour affiant was

the attorney for the estate. The will of Diane Rothe provided for a contingent
bequest (in the sole discretion of the trustees) to the Idaho Trial Lawyers
Association for educational purposes. The ldafbo Trial Lawyers Association drd
not have a vested gift from the estate. The "gift' was entirely discretionary on
the part of the trustee o f the trust. Attorney ~ o h h
T. Mitchell was the Treasurer

af the ITLA at the time. Attorney Mitchell sent:l.ktter after letter to your affiant
over a ten (1 0 ) month period. The corresponde'nce demanded information from
the file and sought to counsel your affiant as

tb ;how to

probate the estate and

what his obligations were. At one point, attoiney Mitchell filed a Petition for
Removal of Personal Representative seeking to remove my client from the
position of personal representative of the estate. Attorney Mitchell sought to
have the son of Diane Rothe removed from the :case so that a third party could
I

be appointed as personal representative of the estate.

6.

My client wanted to report attorney; Mitchell to the Stare Bar for
I

seeking the appointment of a substitute persodal' representathe when attorney
t appoint as
Mitchell did not represent the person who attoraek Mitchell s ~ u g hto
I

substitute personal representative of the estate. i :
j

7.

!

A true and correct copy of a letter acknowledging this fact is

attached as Exhibit A. The letter was received frdh attorney Mitchell.
I,

8.

I

The relationship between myself and then attorney Mitchell was not
I

adversarial, it was hostile.

Leeander James took over the Rothe case from

attorney Mitchell when he took the bench.
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN

-3

i

t

I

:

I

I

9.

Although nor mentiloned by the Court in the decision denying the

motion for disqualification, attorney Mitchell and your affiant had a second case

together before attorney Mitchell took the bench. That case was Direman v. K &
L RV Sa/es and Service, lnc., Case No. CV-00-1973

I questioned attorney

Mitchell% ethics in that case as well in the course af my representwon of R & L
RV. That was a case where

R 6

L RV purchaseld a, used recreational vehicle,

~pparently a prior owner had rolled-back tb odometer reading of the
vehicle-erasing

Ir

thousands of miles of use. R & L was unaware of this fact when

bought that used recreational vehicle.

10.

The attorney who represented R & L RV before your affiant took aver

the representation had erroneously answered a discovery request that made it
appear that R & L had not been supplied an odometer disclosure form when in
fact it had. Your affiant brought the error to the attention of attorney Mitchell.
Although R & L RV cammitred no wrang, attorney Nltchell would not dismiss the
company from the lawsuit.

f questioned the ethics of attorney Mitchell in

continuing to pursue R & L RV even though the company committed no wrong.

11.

R & L RV eventually bought its way out of the! case through a

statutory offer of settlement.

12.

The cases of Rothe and R & L R V provide the background for why

the Honorable John T. Mitchell voluntarily disqjualified himself in the case of
Yovichin v. Bush, a case where 1 was counsel for rhie Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
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DATED this

7

day of July, 2007.
JOHN P. WWELAN, P.C,

u,

Atr rn y for Defendants
Subscribed and sworn before me this
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day of July, 2007.

I HEREBY CERTIFY ihat on the %?day

ofJuly. Z O O 7 1 caused to be

served a rrue and correct copy of the foregoing: by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
Susan P. Weeks

James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at taw
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4

Via:

/US.

Mail, postage prepaid

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C,
2 1 3 N. 4" h~rreer
Coeur d%lene, ID 8381 4

Tele.: (208)664-5897
Fax: (208) 664-2240

IS13# 6083

'I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C$UNTY OF KOOTENAI
I
I

t

/

/ 11
11

TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

CASE NO CV-03-04621
i 14
Ill

Plaintiff,

~EMORANDUMIN SUPPORT OF

~ O T I O NFOR
RECONSIDERATION
/ /I

vs.

(EARING DATE: August 6, 2007

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

YME:

I

1

1

1 :30 p.m.

J~~~DG
John
E : T. Mitchell

I
/

Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Bren a J. Lawrence, by and through

/9
their attorney of record, john P. Whelan, submits the following memorandum in
Ill

support of motion for reconsideration:

II

I,
I

/

l i1
i

I,

1b

STATEMEMT-Q?

FACTS
I

Counsel for the Lawrences filed a motion requesting that the Honorable
I

John T. Mitchell disqualify himself for cause due (0 bias andlor prejudice against
the Lawrences' counsel. The Court did not rule dn the motion when the oral
argument was presented on June 13, 2007.

1

I.(

On June 25, 2007, the Court filed its decisikn denying the motion for
disqualificarion The decision war filed only a h e l the Court conducted its own
I

independent investigation into the facts. The deii~sionof the Court was
13

obviously based on matters outside of the recordiiin this proceeding, and based

/

on matters not even referenced by counsel in theiimotion or at oral argument.

j',

to the case of thegstate o f

Counsel for the Lawrences made no refere*e

I/

Diane Rothe, Case No. SP 00675. The Court nev pheless performed an

independent review of this case and opined that

fthe

case may have been the

1'

reason why the Court voluntarily disqualified irse S in the case of Yovichin v.

/b
I!

Bush, a case where the Lawrences' counsel was tliie attorney of record for the
Defendants in the action. The Court speculated ivl i t s June 25, 2007 decision

:I

I!

that the voluntary disqoalificatSon might have be n filed due to t h e adversarial
role that attorney Mitchell played in that case before taking the bench.
The Estate of Diane Rorhe was a probate acikion. John P. Mhelan was the
I!

attorney far the estate. The will of Diane Rothe pkovided for a conringent
I1 '
bequest to the ldaho Trial Lawyers Association fo educational purposes. The

%i

Idaho Trial Lawyers Association did not have a ve$ted gift from the estate. The
i,
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/
t

/i:
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"gifr" was discretionary wirh the trustees of a trud$ thar was to be created.
1

'i

Attorney John T, Mitchell was the Treasurer of the: I T U at the time. Attorney
i

Mitchell sent over a dozen letters to anorney ~ l u d l a n
over a ten (1 0 ) month
period. The correspondence demanded infor

om the file and sought t o

counsel attorney Whelan as to how he should pr

ate the esrare and what his

obligations were. At one point, attorney Mitche

led a Petition for Removal of

Personal Representative reeking to remove atto

Whelan's client from the

position of personal representar~veof the estat

torney Mitchell sought to

have the son of' Diane Rothe removed from the

so that a third party could

be appointed as personal representative of the

Attorney Whelan's client wanted to repo
for seeking the appointment of a substitute p

ey Mirchell to the State Bar
epresentative when

attorney Mitchell did not represent the person wkfb
attorney Mitchell sought to
/I
appoint as substitute personal representative of
A copy of a letter acknowledging this fact

to the accompanying

supplemenral affidavit of John P. Whelan.
The relationship between attorney Whelan
not adversarial, it was hostile. Leeandcr James t

ttorney Mitchell was
e Rorhe case from

attorney Mitchell when he took the bench.
Although not mentioned by the Court in t
far disqualificatian, attorney Mitchell and

artorn

together before attorney MDtchell took the benc

L RVSales and Service, Inc., Case No. CV-00-1
MEMORLZNDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDE

denying the motion
ad a second case

was Dj&man v. R &

questioned attorney Mitcheli's ethics in that case:ii'n the course af Whelan's
,[I

representation af R & L RV. That was a case where R & L RV purchased a used
l'$l

recreational ve hirle. Apparently a prior owner

rolled-back the odometer

reading of the vehicle-erasing

of use. R & L was unaware of

this fact when

thousands of

7r bought that used recreation

The attorney who represented R $ L R

torney Whelan took over

the representation had erroneously answere

ry request that made it

appear that R & L had not been supplied an

Psclosure form when in

fact it had. Attorney Whelan broughnhe er

rention af attorney

Mitchell. Although R 81L RV committed no

ney Mitchell would not

dismiss the company from the lawsuit. Att

questioned the ethics

of attorney Mitchell in continuing to pursu

n though the company

committed no wrong.
R & L RV eventually bought i t s way

through a statutory

offer af settlement.

The cases of Rurfie and R & L R V p

round for why the

Honorable John T. Mitchell voluntarily di

f in the case of

Yovichin v. Bush, a case where attorney

sei for the Defendanxs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDE

1

'iI

!

Although stared in dicta, the Supreme Cou,qt in State v. Breyer, 40 Idaho
/1

324, 232, P. 560 (1 925) alluded to the fact that

14would be clearly improper f o r
:$ ,

a Judge to make an independent investigatian O F he facts in a case (or motion),

1

/Il/ ;
I

,ill '

ecites that a judge shall

he judge's impartiality
here the judge has a
' s lawyer, gr hxs.

id suggest, at the very
ight be reasonably be
rove the Lawrences'

n of the facts. This is
position of having to
e concluslons reached

were not justified.
he motion for

d isqualification for cause based on these facts.
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DATED this

37

I

/i
I

day of July, 2007.

/1

1/

ll//

IRerpecrfuliy
/I/I
submitted,
I#,/

lj,

111i

~IOHN
P. WHELAN, P.C.

-.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

I

I HEREBY CERTIFY that an the z 5 i a y

of July, 2007. I caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing (jy the method indicated below,

and addressed to the following:

1i
I!

/!
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive

Suite 200
Coeur d' A1 ne, ID 8381 4
Via:

4U.S.

Mail, portage prepaid

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

/I
I

Il1

/I
I
I

1I
I

I

O.f/24/2007

0 3 20 F A X

John P

6G42240

Wheian,

P C

#s<T-

&
SS
* s
**v

JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C.
2 1 3 N. 4'lhStreet
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891

Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISEM 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER SUB ASSET INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

PlaintifT,
vs

.

CASE NO. CV-03-04621
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFlDAVlT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
(WITH EXHIBIT ATTACHED)

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

HEARING DATE: August 6, 2007
TINE:

1 :30 p.m.

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

1
) ss.

County of Kootenai

)

I, John P, Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.
Lawrence.

I am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda
I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could

AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF jOHN P. WHElAhl - 1

.
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john

P

Chelan, F C
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competently testify. This affidavit i s offered in support of Defendants' motion
for reeonsideratEorn of an order of the Court denying Defendants' motion for
disqualification for cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed on June 25, 2007.

2.

On behalf of the Lawrences I filed a motion requesting that the

Honorable John T. Mitchell disqualiQ himself far cause due to bias and/or
prejudice against your affiant. The Court did not rule on the motion when the
oral argument was presented on June 13, 2007, the matter was taken under
su brnission

3.

On fune 25, 2007, the Court filed its decision denying the motion

for disqualification. The decision was filed only after the Court conducted its
own independent investigation into the facts.

The decision of the Court was

obviously based on matters outside of the record in this proceeding, and based
on matters not even referenced by your affiant in the motion or at oral
argument.

4,

Your affiant made no reference to the case of the Estate o f Diane

Rothe, Case No. SP 00675 (2000).

The Court nevertheless performed an

independent review of this case and opined that the case may have been the
reason why the Court voluntarily disqualified itself in the case of Yo~ithlnV.
Bush, a case where your affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in

the action. The Court speculated in its June 25, 2007 decision that rhe voluntary
disqualification might have been filed due to the adversarial role that attorney
Mitchell played in that case before taking the bench.

AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
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5.

The Estate of Diane Rolhc was a probate action. Your affiant was

the aaorney for the estate. The will of Diane Rothe provided For a contingent
bequest (in the sole discretion of the trustees) to the ldaho Trial Lawyers
Association for educational purposes. The ldaho Trial Lawyers Association did
not have a vested gift from the estate, The "gift" war; entirely discretionary on
the pan o f the trustee of the trust. Anorney John T. Mitchell was the Treasurer

of the ITM at the time. Attorney Mitchell sent letter after letter to your affiant
over a ten (1 0) month period. The correspondence demanded information from
the file and sought t o counsel your affiant as to how to probate the estate and
what his obligations were.

At one point, artorney Mitchell filed a Petition for

Removal of Personal Representative seeking to remove my client from the
position of personal representative of the estate,

Attorney Mitchell sought to

have the son of Diane Rothe removed from the case so that a third party could
be appointed as personal representative of the estate.

6.

My client wanted to report attorney Mitchell to the State Bar for

seeking the appointment of a substitute personal representative when attorney
Mitchell did not represent the person who attorney Mitchell sought t o appoint as
substitute personal representative of the estate.

7.

A true and correct copy o f a letter acknowledging this fact i s

attached as Exhibit A. The letter was received from attorney Mitchell.

8.

The relationship between myself and then attorney Mltchell was not

adversarial, it was hostile.

Leeander James took over the Rorhe case from

attorney Mitchell when he took the bench.
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
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9.

Although not mentioned by the Court in the decision denying the

motion for disqualification, attorney Mitchell and your affiant had a second case
together before attorney Mitchell took the bench. That case was Diteman v. /? &

1. RV Sales and Service, lnc., Case No. CV-00-1973

1 questioned attorney

Mitchell's ethics in that case as well in the course of my representation of R & L

RV.

That was a case where R & L RV purchased a used recreational vehicle.

Apparently a prior owner had rolled-back

the odometer reading of the

vehicle-erasing thousands of miles of use, R & L was unaware of this fact when
it bought that used recreational vehicle.

10.

The attorney who represenred R & L RV before your affiant took over

the representation had erroneously answered a discovery request that made it
appear that R & L had not been supplied an odometer disclosure form when in
fact it had. Your affiant brought the error to the attention of attorney Mitchell.
Although R & L RV committed no wrong, attorney Mitchell would not dismiss the
company from the lawsuit.

1 questioned the ethics of attorney Mitchell in

continuing to pursue R & L RV even though the company committed no wrong.

11.

R & L RV eventually bought i t s way out of the case through a

statutory offer of settlement.

1 2.

The cases of Rothe and R & L R V provide the background for why

the Honorable John T. Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case of
Yovichin v. Bush, a case where I was counsel for the Defendants.
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DATED r h i i v day of July, 2007"

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

~ q f l nb. Whelan

!4Wy
for Defendants

Subscribed and sworn before me this ~ # ~ ' dofaJuly,
~ 2007.

Notary public in and fobhehtaie of Idaho
'/
Residing at: ??stMy Comrn. Expires: 12/29/ 11

akv
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W O N A S A. MXTmELL

J o H N T.MITCHELL
408 E.

A ~torneysAt L ~ W
Sherrnm Avanua, 3uita 318

Caeur d'lllene, ID 83814.2778

December 1,2000

Fax: (208) 765-1046
J. P,Whelm
702 N. 4'h, Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, I
D 838 14

Dear Mr. Whelan:

RE; Estate of Dianne Rothe
1 have scheduled a hearing on our Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for
Cause, and for Appointment of Successor Personal Representative, for January 29, 2001, at
9130 a.m, before Judge Marano. A Notice of Hearing is enclosed.
Perhaps this matter can be resolved short of that hearing.
The purpose of this letter is to clear up some of the things that you stated during the
November 27,2000 deposition of Jim Hannon.
You stated that your client, Butch Rothe, wanted you to turn me into the Idaho Stare
Bar. I encouraged you to do that if you felt necessary. You tl1e11 told me that you told your
cl;~a:s :c ttirn me i3t3 the b z t5c;nrsel~res..4,oain, if either you nr they feel that I have done
anything unethical, please have them report me to the bar. If you feel I have done anytlling
unethical, you have an affirmative obligation to turn me into the bar.
During the deposition, you asked Jim Hannon if he had ever discussed with D i a n e
Rorhe, that her whole gift to the foundation could fail because Jirn Hannon named hiinself as
a Tmstee. That theory which you articulated finds no support in the law. Please review
Ida110 Rule of Professional Conduct 1,8(c) which states that a lawyer shall not prepare an
instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as a parent, cliild, sibling, or
spouse any substantial g& fkom client, including a testamentary Rift, except where the client
is related to the donee. Clearly, Jim Harmon as a trustee is not the recipient of any "gift"
under the tmst. Case law from other jurisdictions states that a lawyer-beneficiarv's
paxticipation in the preparation or execution of the Will raises the presumption of undue
influence, again, Mr. H m o n was not, nor can he be a beneficiarv under Dianne's Will. A
similar result is found when you review ABA C m o n 5, ethical considwarion 5-6, that slates
a lawyer shall not conscientiously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or
lawyer in an instrument, In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such,
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care shall be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the rylpeamce of impropriety. I think Mr.
Harmon covered in his deposition, the fact that it was Dianne who wished Jim I-Imnon and
her other attorneys, to serve as GO-trustees.
]In any event, there are hvo separate issues, You asked if Jim Harmon had considered
the fact that he had named himself as trustee, to be an ethical violation. If you view it as an
unethical violation, yo^ have a duty to report Mr. Harmon to the bar. An entirely separate
issue is whether the fact that Jim Hamon is named as a trustee causes the entire gift to fail,
which is exactly what you insinuated during the deposition. There simply isn't any legal
basis to support your alcgation.

Next, in the deposition you raised the theory that if these attorney trustees resigned,
and since there is no provision for replacement, the trust would fail. Once again, there is no
legal theory to support your claim. Please look at Idaho Code $68-101 and Ida110 Code 9683 02. The trust survives the renunciation of other trustees, and if, by chance, all the trustees
appoint replacements.
should renounce, the District C o w

You mentioned that all of the attorney trustees had renounced their interest: in serving
as trustees, but that begs the question. The foundation hasn't been created yet, due to your
client's failure to perform his duties as personal representative. I don't see how a11y
renunciation can be valid until the estate kicks loose the hnds to create the fo~~ndation.
ARw the deposition, you asked about the possibility of settlement. The Idaho Trial

Lawyers Association is certainly interested in settlement. When you discussed settlement,
you mentioned the possibility of this case being dragged out, and the specter of attorney fees
reducing the value of any money that could be available for the foundation. I suggest you
take another look at the probate code to determine who will be paying for your attorney's
fees. Since the probate was converted to a formal probate, you cannot receive attorney's fees
out of probate assets without the couxtk prior approval. W i l e I agree that your office would
be entitled to attorney's fees for preparing the initial probate pleadings, your office is not
entitled to any other attorney fees for time spent contesting the validity of the Will. It would
be unethical for an attorney to charge attorney's fees against the estate for such an action, as
the personal represmtative has a duty to the legacies under the Will, to enforce the Will md
defend the Will, not contest the Will. Additionally, the personal representative has a duty to
inaxirnize the estate left for tl~elegacies. The personal representative sirnply cannot challenge
the valid~tyof the Will, and seek to have his attorney fees for doing so paid from the asscts
from the estate. I direct your attention to Idaho Code $15-3-703(a), Idaho Code 5 15-3-709,
Idaho Code 5 15-3-712 and Idaho Code $15-3-715(21).
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I also don't see how you are going to get your attorney fees paid for out of the estate,
for time spent discussing matters with me, since tlie vast majority oithat time has been spent
with my wing to get you to get your client to meet his duties under Idciho law to the
beneficiaries under the Will.
My suggestion is as follows. Your client prepares a detailed iitventory and accounting
that can be verified, and find out what is left over after the payment of legitimate expenses.
This would include itemized statements of the interest bearing account showing what intetesr
h u accrued since the account's inception, and also what expenses have been paid by the
estate since the decedent's death and what expenses are claimed and unpaid against the csrate.
The trustees can then convene to determine what is to be done with the remaining funds.

(
JTM:cs
Enc.
cc:

Kay Shields
Jim Hannon

JO?

T.Mitchell

CERTIFICATE OF SEWICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the v d a y ofJuly, 2007, 1 caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,

and addressed to the following:
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law

1875 N, Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4

.S. Mall, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
2 1 3 N. 4" Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1
Plaintiff,
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT
VS.

HEARING DATE: August 7,
2007

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

TIME:

4:00 p.m.

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell
Defendants.

I

COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by
and through their counsel of record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motion this
court, pursuant to Rules 6(b) and 56(c) and 56(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, for an enlargement of time in which to file their opposition in
response t o Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendants request to
file their response on or after November 1, 2007. The affidavits of John P.

MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 1

Whelan and Doug Lawrence are offered in support of this motion. Defendant's
request oral argument.
This motion i s made on the grounds that Defendant's have not had the
opportunity to complete discovery and determine the whereabouts of the
various witnesses whose affidavits are relied upon by Plaintiff, as Plaintiff's
counsel filed a motion for summary judgment shortly after the Remittitur issued
in this case. Defendants made a prior motion for enlargement that was never
ruled upon by the Court. No further discovery has taken place since the motion
was made due to the fact that the Court has yet t o rule on the original motion
for enlargement. Defendants have yet to complete their discovery in the instant
action, so additional time to respond to Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
i s warranted. Defendants anticipate that they will take the depositions of each

person who has submitted an affidavit for Plaintiff in this action. Many of the
witnesses are believed to reside out of state.

DATED this 2 d d a y of July, 2007.
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of July, 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d l Al ne, ID 8381 4
Via:

U
' S.

Mail, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

2 2 3 N. 4" Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4

Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO STRIKE
VS.

HEARING DATE: August 7, 2007
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

TIME:

4:00 p.m.

JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL

Defendants.

Plaintiffs, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by and through their
attorney of record, John P. Whelan, hereby move the court to strike the
objectionable portions of the Affidavits of Harold Funk, John Rook, Robert Hall
and Susan Weeks, identified herein, which affidavits were offered in support to
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. This motion i s made on the grounds
of I.R.C.P. Rule 7(b)(l), 1 2(f) and 56(e) and the case of Posey v. Ford Motor
MOTION TO STRIKE - 1

7 J'(2

Credff Go., 1 1 1 P. 3d 162 (Id. Ct App. 2005). Defendants requests oral

argument.

AFFIDAVIT OF FUNK
Defendants move to strike the following portions of the Affidavit of Harold
Funk:

predecessor is irrelevant
under the doctrine of

last sentence

predecessor is irrelevant
under the doctrine of

3.

Paragraph 4, pg. 2,
1 s t sentence

Foundation; relevance

Funk fails to identify the
relevant time period.

4.

Paragraph 6, pg. 3,
4th through 7th
sentences

Relevance; hearsay;
foundation (7th
sentence)

Funk's sale agreement
merged into the deed to
Human Synergistics.

5

Paragraph 6 , pg. 3,
8th and 9th
sentences

Relevance; parole
evidence

The Funk's intent i s
irrelevant parole evidence
in that the land contract
merged with the deed
and the deed i s not
ambiguous.

Defendants move to strike Ex. A on the same grounds.
MOTION TO STRIKE - 2

second to last

statement of "continuous
use" is not supported by

Relevance; hearsay
last sentence

which parcel he refers to,
rendering the statement
irrelevant. Funk also
does not identify which
"same private road" he
refers to, and whether
the road is on the
Lawrence parcel.

1 s t sentence

9.

Paragraph 9, pg. 4,
2nd and 3rd
sentences

The sale agreement
merged with the deed;
therefore the land sale
contract is irrelevant in

Foundation;
relevance2

Defendants also move to strike Ex. "F" as well as hearsay evidence.
MOTION TO STRIKE - 3

AFFIDAVIT OF lOHN ROOK

Defendants move to strike the following portions of the Affidavit of John
Rook:

2nd sentence

foundation for his
claimed knowledge and
does not identify which
"road" he refers to, nor
does he place the road
on the Lawrence parcel.

2.

Paragraph 4, pgs. 2
and 3, 1 st, 2nd and
3rd sentences

Foundation; relevance

Rook does not lay the
foundation for his
claimed knowledge and
does not identify which
"road" he refers to, nor
does he place the road
on the Lawrence parcel.

3.

Paragraph4,pg.3,
5th sentence

Foundation; relevance

Rook does not lay the
foundation for his
claimed knowledge and
does not identify which
"road" he refers to, nor
does he place the road
on the Lawrence parcel.

MOTION TO STRIKE
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I All references to a

I Foundation; relevance / Rook's repeated

road in the affidavit

I

I

I

reference to roads or a
road i s irrelevant in that
Rook does not identify
the roads as crossing the
Lawrence parcel.

Paragraph 4, pg. 3,
6th sentence

Foundation; Best
Evidence Rule;
relevance; parole
evidence

Rook's conclusionary
statement about the right
to use '"he road" lacks
foundation and violates
the best evidence rule
and the parole evidence
rule in that the deed to
Kootenai Broadcasting i s
the best evidence of i t s
rights, not the
conclusionary statements
of Rook.

Paragraph 4, pg. 3,
last sentence

Foundation; relevance;
improper opinion
evidence

Rook makes no reference
to the use of Kootenai
Broadcasting of the road
other than this
conclusionary statement.
The statement lacks
foundation and i s an
improper legal opinion
offered by a lay witness.

MOTION TO STRIKE - 5

paragraph 5 , pg. 3,

8.

Paragraphe, pg. 3,
entire paragraph

irrelevant hearsay
without a foundation
establishing that the road
crosses the Lawrence

Foundation; relevance;
improper opinion
evidence

Rook's conclusionary
statement about Funk's
access i s devoid of
foundation and therefore
irrelevant.

AFFIDAVIT OF HALL
Defendants move to strike the following portions of the Affidavit of Robert
Hall:

notice of assignment.
The Ex. A lease
referenced requires prior
written authorization
from Hall prior to any
assignment. In that
Tower's rights, if any,
stem from an alleged
leasehold, Hall must
necessarily establish the
foundation that he
accepted the purported
assignment in writing.
MOTION TO STRIKE - 6
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road to which he refers
or the location of the
road, nor does he

improper opinion
evidence

source of knowledge. He
purports to render an
opinion about Switzer's
access without any
foundation for his
statement
Hall's conclusionary
statement is not
supported by any
foundational facts. The
road to which Hall refers
i s not identified.

5.

Paragraph 7, pg. 3,
last sentence

Foundation; relevance

6.

Paragraph 8, pg. 3

Foundation; relevance; The "road" i s not
improper opinion
identified; the claimed
evidence
basis for Hall's
knowledge i s not
identified; Hall offers
testimony about the
location of land without
establishing his expertise
as a surveyor.

MOTION TO STRIKE - 7

162

foundation and is
inadmissible hearsay

sentences; Exhibit B

identified; no foundation
i s laid for Hall's claimed

AFFIDAVIT OF WEEKS
Defendants move t o strike the following portions of the Affidavit of Susan
Weeks:

for which no foundation
has been laid. The
deposition testimony is
irrelevant to this
proceeding.

2.

Paragraph 8, pg. 6,
and Exhibit "Z"

Foundation; hearsay;
relevance

this hearsay document.

3.

Paragraph 9, pg. 6
and Exhibit "AA"

Foundation; hearsay;
relevance

No foundation i s laid for
this hearsay document.

4.

Paragraph 10, pg. 6
and Exhibit "BB"

Foundation; hearsay;
relevance

No foundation is laid for

Paragraph 1 1 , pg. 6
and Exhibit "CC"

Foundation; hearsay;
relevance

5.

No foundation is laid for

this hearsay document.
No foundation i s laid for
this hearsay document.

MOTION TO STRIKE - 8
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this hearsay document.

nd Exhibit "FF"

DATED this

day of July, 2007.
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

MOTION TO STRIKE - 9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

y/Llr day of July, 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
18-75 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d l Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:

4 . S . Mail, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

Joh P. Whelan

i?

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
2 1 3 N. 4th Street
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND
BRENDA LAWRENCE TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF

HEARING DATE: August 7, 2007
TIME:

Defendants.

4:00 p.m.

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, by and through
their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, submits the following opposition to
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment:

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
PLAINTIFF - 1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Tower Assets Sub, Inc.'s unverifiedcomplaint alleges that it "has a vested
leasehold interest in certain real property leased from Robert and Brenda all."'
As the alleged holder of a leasehold interest, Plaintiff seeks to establish that it
has a right to cross the land of Defendants under theories of easement by
necessity, by implication or by prescriptive use.* Plaintiff has previously alleged
that it had an express easement, but that theory was rejected on appeal.
The ldaho Supreme Court has previously ruled in this case that Tower
would not have standing to seek to quiet title to the land owned by Lawrence or

all.^ Yet Tower persists in i t s efforts to establish an easement for the Ha//
parcelunder theories of easement by necessity or implication. That is, Tower

Page 1 , paragraph I, of Plaintiff's Complaint. No evidence has been offered in support
of this allegation. The statute of frauds requires leaseholds in duration of one year or more to
be in writing. (Idaho Code 9-503).
Second, third and fourth Causes of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint. No admissible
evidence has been offered that Plaintiffhas been granted any interest whatsoever in the land at
issue in Plaintiff's Complaint. At best, Plaintiff has established that it may have a leasehold
interest in land owned by Hall. The deed to Hall (marked as Exhibit U to the Affidavit of Weeks)
makes no mention of the Lawrence parcel. If Hall has no right t o use the Lawrence parcel, Hall's
leaseholders would have no rights either. Hall is not a party to this action.
The Supreme Court ruled as follows: "Tower will have standing t o seek iniunctive
relief if it can establish it has an alleged legal right t o benefit from the Blossom Mountain road
easement. As lessee of the alleged dominant estate, Tower derives its right t o use the alleged
easement from its lessor, Hall". (Emphasis Added). Tower Asset Sub, lnc. v. Lawrence, 143
ldaho 710 (2007).

-

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
PLAINTIFF - 2

attempts quiet title to the Hall and Lawrence parcels, as opposed to merely
seeking an injunction to enjoin an interference with access. Hall has no
established easement by necessity or by implication. Therefore, he cannot lease
or assign those rights to others.
Accordingly, the only theory of easement that can be advanced by Tower
would be a theory based on prescriptive use.
The opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence i s based on this
memorandum, the court records and the affidavits that have been filed in this
action. The Lawrences have also filed a motion for enlargement of time to
respond to this motion for summary judgment.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED "UNDISPUTED FACTS"
Many of the facts alleged by Plaintiff as bing "undisputed" are not
supported by the record in this action. However, rather than addressing each
erroneous fact here, Defendants would invite the Court's attention to the

admissible portions of the affidavits and the competent and admissible evidence
in this action.

DEFENDANTS PARTIAL STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Since 1966, General Telephone has had a deeded right to use an

access road that crosses the Lawrence parcel in section 21.

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
PLAINTIFF - 3

2.

General Telephone has a legal right to cross sections 2 1 and 2 8 (see

Exhibit "X3"Affidavit

of Weeks); whereas Funk has never had the right to cross

section 28.

3.

There is no evidence that Section 28 was ever owned by Funk,

therefore there i s no unity of t i t l e in this case.
4.

The owner of Section 28 i s not a party to this action.

5.

Contrary to the allegations made, Funk has always had access to his

lands from Mellick Road.
6.

Funk i s not a party to this action.

7.

No clear and convincing evidence has been offered to establish a

prescriptive easement.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment should not be granted if reasonable people could
reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inference from the evidence, as
summary judgment i s proper where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of
material fact. Farm Credit o f Spokane v. Stevenson, 1 25 ldaho 270, 869 P.2d
1365; Rule 56(c), ldaho R. Civ. P.
Summary judgment i s only proper if the pleadings, depositions, and
admission on the file together with the affidavits, i f any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party i s entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 1.R.C.P 56(c).
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
PLAINTIFF - 4
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IF the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court
should grant the motion for summary judgment. Farm Credit Bank v. Stevenson,
125 ldaho 270, 272, 896 P.2d 1 365, 1 367 (1 994). If the nonmoving party does
not come forward with evidence as provided in I.R.C.P. 56(c), then summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party." Meikle v. Torry
Watson, 138 ldaho 680 (2003). Summary judgment is properly granted in favor
of the moving party when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party's case upon which that party bears the burden
of proof at trial. Meikle v. Torry Watson, 138 ldaho 680 (2003).

STANDING
The issue of standing is jurisdictional. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for
Term Limits, 135 ldaho 121, 124, 1 5 P.3d 1 1 29, 1 132 (2000). The issue of
standing may be raised at any time. Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 ldaho 33, 35, 644
P.2d 355, 357 (1 982). Only the owner of the dominant estate has standing to
quiet title to an easement appurtenant to that estate. Beach Lateral Water Users
Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 ldaho 600, 130 P.3d 1 1 38 (2006).
There are but two types of easements:
(1)

Easements in gross; and

(2)

Appurtenant easements.

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
PLAINTIFF - 5
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An easement in gross is personal to the easement holder. King v. Lang, 1 2 6
ldaho 905, 42 P.3d 698 (2002). There i s no evidence that the Lawrences or
anyone else created such an easement in favor of Tower.
"An easement appurtenant i s a right to use a certain parcel, the servient
estate, for the benefit of another parcel the dominant estate. Essentially, an
easement appurtenant serves the owner of the dominant estate in a way that
cannot be separated from his rights in the land." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 ldaho
225, 230, 76 P.3d 969 (2003).
Accordingly, in light of Tower's allegation that it is a lessee of Hall, Tower
lacks standing to assert claims of easement by necessity or by implication.
As alluded to by the ldaho Supreme Court in its opinion pertaining to the
matter at hand, Tower has standing to seek injunctive relief if it can demonstrate
that it has an existing right to use the subject easement. Since Hall has
established no easement by implication or necessity, Tower lacks standing to
pursue those theories.
If Tower can establish a prescriptive easement, it would have standing to
enjoin the interference with such a right.

TOWER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A LESSEE OR ASSIGNEE OF THE HALL
LEASE
The only factual allegations in the record regarding Tower's status are
contained in the unverifiedcomplaint of Tower and in the Affidavit of Robert
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
PLAINTIFF - 6

Hall (filed Sept. 1 3 , 2004) offered by Plaintiff in support of its first motion for
summary judgment.
Hall does not state that Tower is his lessee, he merely states that the land
was leased to Nextel West Corp. and that "we received notice that this lease was
assigned to Tower Parent Corp. and Tower Asset Sub, l n ~ . " ~
Hall goes on to state "Tower Asset Sub, Inc. continues to lease the site
from us.' A copy o f the Nextell lease is attached to Hall's affidavit as Exhibit "A"
The lease prohibits the assignment of the lease by Nextel without Hall's prior
~
affidavit does not recite that he provided the written
written ~ o n s e n t .Hall's
consent or that he otherwise agreed to the assignment.
Accordingly, Tower has failed to establish that it is even a lessee.'
Tower's status is certainly a genuine issue of fact.

See Hall Affidavit, pg. 2, paragraph 4.
Id, paragraph 5.
See Hall affidavit, Exhibit "A", paragraph 14.
This issue has been raised previously and Tower has offered no additional proof on
the issue. The inference therefore, is that Tower has no proof.
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
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PERNlSSlVE
As stated by the affidavit of Daniel Rebor offered by Plaintiff in support of
i t s motion for summary judgment, Nextel obtained an access license from the

~ a w r e n c e s .Tower
~
took an assignment of that access agreement and "[Slince
May of 1 999 Plaintiff has continuously paid the monthly licensing fee by check
which identifies Spectra Site as payee.'
For the last ten (1 0) years, Tower's use of the Lawrence easement has
been permissive. Permissive use negates any claim for an easement by
prescription. Melendez v. Hintz, 1 1 1 Idaho 401, 724 P.2d 137 (1 986).

ELEMENTS OF EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION NOT SATISFIED
Funk severed the Lawrence parcel from his remaining land in 1975 when
he entered into the Sale Agreement with Human Synergistics."

In 1972, Funk

acquired the right to cross the Mead property in Section 21 but Funk had no
right to cross Section 28 to access his lands in Sections 21 and 22.

See affidavit of Rebor, filed September 13, 2004, paragraphs 3-5.

Id, paragraph 6.
lo

See affidavit of Weeks filed September 13, 2004, pg. 2, paragraph "e" and Exhibit "E"

thereto.
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
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The parcel at issue in this litigation was not created (or severed) from
Funk's other lands until 1977 when Funk conveyed to Rasmussen/Chamberlain."
Clearly, then, until the 1977 conveyance to Rasmussen/Chamberlain, the
land allegedly leased by Tower was but an undivided portion of the acreage held
by Funk in Section 22. Funk had access to that section via Mellick Road
There is absolutely no evidence in the record that suggests that there was
an existing access road to the land that would eventually become the
Rasmussen/Chamberalin parcel i n f 975 when Funk severed what would become
the Lawrence parcel (the servient estate) from Funk's other holdings (the
dominant estate).
Therefore, the easement claimed by Tower did not exist in 1975 when the
servient estate was severed from the dominant estate, i.e. there was no prior use.
Furthermore, Funk never had the legal right to cross Section 28 from
Section 21 to access his land in Section 22. Funk cannot create by implication
that which did not exist in fact in 1975. There was no access road to the land at
issue in this action in 1975. Thus, the key element to establish an easement by
implication is lacking in the instant action.
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in the case of Bear island Water Assoc.,
Id., that:
To establish an easement by implication from prior use,
the party seeking to establish the easement must

l1

Id, page 4, paragraph 3(a)-(e).
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
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demonstrate three essential elements: (1) unity of title or
ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the
dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long
enough before conveyance of the dominant estate to
show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3)
the easement must be reasonably necessary to the
proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Close v.
Rensink, 95 ldaho 172, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387; Davis v.
Cowen, 83 ldaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403, 406-07
(1 961 ). (Emphasis added).
The third element recited above requires proof that a disputed access is
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. As stated
in the affidavits of Douglas Lawrence and Bruce Anderson, Funk has always had
access to his Section 22 property via Mellick Road. Funk or his successors can,
and should. provide access to Tower.

EASEMENT BY NECESSITY
An easement by necessity is founded on the following legal theory:
"A way of necessity is an easement arising from an
implied grant or implied reservation; it is of common law
origin and is supported by the rule of sound public
policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for
occupancy or successful cultivation ... It is a universallv
established principle that where a tract of land i s
conveved which i s separated from the hiqhway bv other
lands of the qrantor or surrounded bv his lands or bv his
and those of third persons, there arises, by implication,
in favor of the grantee, a way of necessity across the
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premises of the qrantor to the highway." (Emphasis
added).
Burley Brick andSand Co. v, Gofer, 102 ldaho 333, 335, 629 P.2d 1 16, 1 1 68
(1 98l)(quoting 17A Am. Jur. Easements
Easements and Licenses

55

5

58 (1 957)); see 25 Am. Jur. 2d

30-03 1 (2005). One who claims an easement by

necessity across another's land must prove "(1) unity of title and subsequent
separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) necessity of the easement at
the time of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." Bear
island WaterAss'n, inc. v. Brown, 125 ldaho 71 7, 725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 (1 994).
In the matter at hand, Tower cannot demonstrate that there was a
necessity for the access across the Lawrence parcel for the benefit o f the parcel
allegedly leased by Tbwerwhen the Lawrence parcel was severed from the other
land retained by Funk. Funk obviously had access to his other lands when he
severed the parcel sold to Human Synergistics in 1 975, otherwise Funk would
have taken great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human
Synergistics in 1 975.
It should be noted that the parcels of land at issue sit on top of a
mountain. The lands are not suited for farming or residential development. The
land is suitable only for the maintenance of radio and phone towers. Nothing in
the record establishes that anything but infrequent access to these sites i s
commonplace.

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
PLAINTIFF - 1 1

EASEMENT BWPRSCRIPTION
To establish an easement by prescription, a party must establish by clear
a n d convincing evidence all of the elements necessary for a prescriptive
easement. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 ldaho 225, 229; Abbot v. NampaSchoolDist.
No. 131, 1 1 9 ldaho 544. Because it is no trivial thing to take another's land
without compensation, easements by prescription are not favored by the law.
Simmons v. Perkins, 63 ldaho 136. A prescriptive easement cannot be granted if
the use of the servient tenement was by permission of its owner, because such
use, by definition, is not adverse to the rights of the owner. Simmons, Id.
In the recent case Hughes v. Fisher, 142 ldaho 474, 129, P.3d 1223 (2006),
the ldaho Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule that the
regular crossing of another's property i s presumed to be adverse. Where a
landowner constructs a way over the land for his own use and convenience, the
mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be
presumed to be by way of permission.
The conclusionary statements offered by Tower in support of its motion for
summary judgment do not constitute clear and convincing evidence of adverse
use that would benefit Tower in the instant case. Tower, itself, makes no claim
of any sort that it has used the Lawrence parcel openly, notoriously, continuously
and in a hostile manner for the statutory period.
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No prescriptive claim has been established and Towers use

05- the Lawrence

access road has always been perrni~sive.'~

DATED this

$7

day of July, 2007.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

ey for Defendants

l2

See affidavits o f Daniel Rebor and Douglas Lawrence.
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